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OVERVIEW 
The century ot enlightenment vas drawing to a close~ Europe was 
surviving the upheavals ot the French Revolution. Napoleon Bonaparte~ 
the young hero of the Italian Campaign, having im_posed the Treaty ot 
Campo J'ormio, had begun work on the Congress of Rastadt, and vu seeking 
new domains ot action to match his creative imagination. In his mind, 
he could perceive the endless string ot those fascinating empires ot an-
tiquity magically garlanded in an interminable succeasion.1 
His next expedition vas to take him to the land ot the Pharaohs and 
the Cannaani tea, later to become part ot the Ottoman Empire, that 'sick 
man • ot Europe whose agony alone would last over a century. 
At this period, the Os'!ll&lllis' domination still extended widely, 
over mo1t varied and renowned regions: the Nile, the Tigris and the 
Euphrate•, the proverbial tertili ty ot whose valleys appeared as a con-
stant challenge to the desert. Mount Ararat, Lebanon' a highest peak, 
which seems, "fallin& into the sea"2 and ottering, at the same time, "a 
refuge and a.n onrture, "3 to give Lebanon that quality whose beauty since 
biblical times, both poets and vri ters have ceaselessly chanted; the 
4 beauty of its cedars and the holy valleys. 
~utros Dib, "Le Drute Palestinian," Chronique de Politique 
Et~re, Vol. m, No. 1 (1968), PP. 1-lT. 
2nerre Rondot, L' Islam et lea Mus!,,!!'!! d' aujourd'hui (Paris: 
Editions de l'Orante, 195~), P. 15. 
3Ibid. 
4 Dib, P. 1. 
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Upon his return, the First Consul was to retrace the crossing of 
the Alps; before Tyre would come Sidon and B;yblos, 'Cradl.e of the 
Alphabet' ; later, Beryte, 'Mother of Laws' ; elsewhere, Mecca and 
Medina, those metropolis of the desert converted to sanctuaries of a 
great religion that hundreds and thousands venerate; 1 then Damascus, 
the beginning of one of the greatest and most rapid conquests ever 
known; then Baghdad, heir to Nineveh and Babylonia, seat of the Cali-
phate and wisdom. Then, Cairo and Istanbul., the continuation of 
Byzantium ••• to these evocative names which are reminiscent of the 
entire chapters of the history of civilization, should there be added 
2 Jordan, Nazareth, .Bethlehem. and Jerusalem? 
The fascinating effect of this spectacular portrayal of the Orient 
must have been profound when Bonaparte exclaimed, "there never have been 
great empires indeed, but in the Orient, next to which Europe is a mole-
hill".3 
However, Napoleon Bonaparte was not an exception in the West. 
When welcoming Ferdinand de Lesseps at the French Academy, Ernest 
Rena.n declAred that, by cutting the Isthmus of Suez, would he change not 
only the face of the continent, but also the site of future battle-
fields. 4 
Just to say that the present is processed out of the past is 
lx>ib, P. l. 
2Ibid. 
3Ibid. 
4 Ibid.' P. 4. 
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insufficient, in this case "the law of history needs a special adap-
tation, a reinforcement in the sense that a permanent presence of the 
past is present in the East."1 Hence, the complexity of the Palestine 
problem, as each question and each detail finds its roots deepened in 
the remote millenia. 2 
1Dib, P. 4. 
2Ibid. 
y 
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INTRODUCTION 
Any attempt at a viable approach to the Arab-Israeli conflict - the 
most complex and heart-rending drama of our epoch - must take into 
account passionate and biased views, with very great distortion of facts. 
This assessment of the dynamics in contemporary Palestinian 
experience, within the context of the Arab-Israeli association, seeks to 
trace the salient features of present realities. It returns to the near 
past, where ambitions of supremacy and interplay of imperialistic in-
terests may be said to have relentlessly worsened Arab-Israeli relations. 
It likewise traces the rise of Jewish nationalism in the Diaspore., 
as well as that of the Arab nationalism in certain provinces of the 
Ottoman Empire. 
While stressing the effect of these forces in Palestine, the focus 
is on British Palestine policy. That policy is published in the Balfour 
Declaration: the idea of a. state within a. state, the so-called "Jewish 
National Home" in Arab Palestine. 
With regard to the general treatment, the subject is presented in a 
strict chronological arrangement but, in order to explain activities 
connected with one another, a retrospective glance has from time to time 
been taken at an episode or a. personality. 
The events of 1948 were responsible for Arab bitterness against 
Occidental political underhandedness; those of 1956, created in Egypt, 
as well as in other Arab countries, a precedence of mistrust of the 
Occidental powers. It also marked the beginning of the Soviet flirtation 
1 
2 
with the Arab World. Furthermore, Egypt's intra-Arab politics ou the one 
hand. and Israel's threat to overthrow the Syrian regime on the other, 
led in different ways. to the culmination of the Third Arab-Israeli War. 
The Third Arab-Israeli War of 1967, therefore, as the climax of 
Palestinian political turbulence, illustrates this all-time political 
paradox in the Palestinian drama. 
Retrospect! vel.y, the germs or the 1967 War can be found in the 
Suez-phobia. ot the 1956 triangle atta.ek by .Angl.o-ll'ralleo-Israel; and the 
kernel of the 1956 crisis in the proclamation of the Sta.te of Israel, in 
1948. 
Furthermore, this stu4y aaa!ysea the developments following the 
erea.tion or the State ot Israel in Arab Palestine. The purpose is not so 
mueh to shed light on past events but 1 more importantly. to show that 
from the bitter experiences ot the past, we may be able to predict the 
direction in which the Jewish State will have to move, it it is to live 
in a durable peace. 
The United Nations warned Israel that their victory in the 1967 War, 
"could turn out to be no more than one successfUl battle in a long and 
losing war. "1 Without the development of policies such as these that 
will be indicated here, this warning would surely be vindicated. 
1
"Edi torial," The Economist, Vol. CCXXIV, No. 64662 (July, 1967). 
CHAPTER I 
HISTORICAL PROFILE 
Pre-1900 Developments 
Convergence of National AsEir,ations.--There is a strange symmetry 
ot events that runs through the renaissance of Judeo-Arab national move-
mente, until their fateful encounter in the Holy Land; whose political 
problems, by virtue of their complexity, tended to be at once intensely 
interesting and immensely critical; thus, Palestine became the battle-
field of European politics. 
A renaissance of both peoples occurred in the last part of the 
19th century: in both cases such an awakening first appeared in a re-
birth of literature; both groups found the expression of their aims in 
the same pol! tical events and uniquely, in the same geographical region. 
It is remarkable, however, that Jewish nationalism manifested it-
self in the dispersion, having neither the unifying force or a race1 or 
territory, nor a common language; while "immured in a hostile environ-
ment,"2 it reawakened to national consciousness and gave birth to a 
modern political movement, "like green shoots breaking from a petrified 
1It is generally believed that Judaism is a religion, not a race. 
The Jews are by origin Semi tee but the modern Israelis are of European 
origin by long residence in Europe, who migrated to Israel. ("cited by") 
Jean-Pierre Alem, Juifs et Arabes, 3000 ans d'histoire (Parisa Flam-
marion, 1968), P. 15. 
2 Arthur Koestler, Promise and Fulfilment: 
(London: Macmillan & Company Ltd., 19 9 , P. 5. 
3 
4 
forest. "1 Piy contrast, the Arab national sentiment was expressed by a 
homogeneous people who had never left their native land. The role of 
religion in the elaboration of their respective aims was also different: 
the ~1osaie religion tended to confine the Jewish people of the Die.spora, 
to borrow Professor Toynbee's expression, within a 'fossilized society'. 
However, Islam had not only unified the Arabs; it had also brought 
together the non-Arab element of the East. Arabism, and its Golden Age, 
wa.s rounded on a common religion, so that tour centuries of Turkish 
occupation le:rt no adverse effect on Arab patriotism; since Arabs "knew 
only Moslem patriotism."2 
It is also interesting that, like the phoenix with no secret, both 
Arabs and Jews emerged from the ashes ot their respective glorious pasts, 
and, in a curious way met in the Prophets' land. 
The most pain:f'ul aspect of this strange encounter is the un:f'or-
tunate tact that a true resurrection of the two opposing elements takes 
place simultaneously. 3 
This is precisely the paradox in the history of the V.iddle East, 
when the question of Jews and Arabs enters into its present phase and 
leads us to the core of the contemporary conflict in Palestine. 
~oestler, P. 5. 
2Jean-Pierre Alem, Juifs et Arabes, 3000 ans d'histoire (Paris: 
Flammarion, 1968)~ P. 73 
~ric Rouleau et al., Israel et les Arabes, le 3e Combat (Paris: 
Edition de Seuil, 1967), P. 170. 
5 
The People Without Land'.1--The nostalgia for Zion had cer-
ta.inly kindled the minds of the Jews ever since the "destruction of the 
temple and the dispersion. n 2 The unceasing chant of 'next year in 
Jerusalem' vas profoundly rooted in the Jewish people of the Diaspora 
and to some extent symbolized the mystic religious drive of the 
Israelites. 3 Like the mingling of the temporal and the spiritual in the 
Orient, this blend of mysticism and national aspirations vas instilled 
in the Jewish soul. It could also be regarded "as an extreme case of 
homesickness of expatriate communities, mixed with mankind's archaic 
yearning for a lost paradise, for a mythological Golden Age which is the 
root of all Utopias, from Spa.rtacus' Sun-State to Rerzl' s Zionism. "4 
Napoleon Bonaparte vas among the first of the gentiles who, during 
a short visit to Palestine, evoked the idea of reconstituting a Jewish 
nation in the Holy Land. 5 Similarly, Enfa.ntine, nicknamed 'Prophet of 
Zionism' , while in Egypt for the inauguration of the work of the Suez 
Isthmus in 1836, had contemplated the possibility of the rebirth of 
Israel as a nation. Returning to France, he persuaded his disciple, 
the Jewish businessman, Eiohtal, to attract the interest of Chancellor 
Metternich towards the realization of this project. But Enfantine's 
1Isrs.el Zangri.ll' s famous slogan "Give the People Without Land, 
the Land Without People." ("cited by") Jean-Pierre Alem, Juifs et 
Arabes, 3000 ans d1histoire (Paris: Flamm3rion, 1968), P. 2. 
2Ibid., P. 25. 
3Ibid., P. 60. 
4 Koestlerp P. 3. 
5 Alem, P. 60. 
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efforts failed. 1 
As far back aa 1839, the British had envisaged the possibility or 
re-establishing a Jewish nation in Palestine. "The Protestants in 
general estimated such a restoration in conformity with the Holy Scrip-
tures. "2 The British Government too, welcOJMd this idea in order to 
counterbalance French and Russian religious undertakings in Palestine. 
At this period, the British had occupied Aden, the Southern exit to the 
Red Sea. 
Pal..merston' 1 e:f'tort1 in the early 184oa to interest the Sublime 
Porte in the restoration ot the Jeva to Palestine have as part or their 
background an earlier phase of Anglo-French rival.r,y in the Levant • 
.Af'ter the s,-rian Epi1ode or l84o-41, Palmerston was determined 
that Mohammad Ali should not succeed, with French connivance, in making 
himself' muter o':f' Syria and Egypt. Mohammad Ali's revolt had to be 
checked, it the Ottoman's insecure empire were to be saved and the 
French discouraged in their dreama or the emergence or a great Arab 
state under Egyptian leadership and J'rench patronage. 3 With this in 
mind, Palmerston made his tirst move in the direction or intereating 
Turkey in the Jewish settlement in Palestine. In a dispatch to the 
British .Ambaasaclor in Constantinople, dated ll August 1840 (the dq ot 
the expulsion or Mohammad Ali trom Syria and the first appearance or a 
British squadron in the port or Beirut) t it Ya8 stated that "there 
exists at present among the Jews dispersed over Europe, a atrong notion 
l Ala, P. 6o. 
2Ibid. 
3 Ibid., P. 61 
7 
that the time is approaching when their nation is to return to Palestine 
. . . It is well known that the Jews of Europe possess great wealth ••• 
The Jewish people, it returning under the sanction and protection of the 
Sul.tan, would be a check upon any future evil designs of Mohammad Ali or 
"1 his successors ••• 
It is interesting to note that Palmerston's estimate of the Jewish 
wealth and influence is emphasised in this dispatch; the idea that the 
Jews were a force in the world and could be uset'ul friends was to re-
appear over and over again in ~itish policy towards Palestine during 
t 
the years 1916-1917.2 
Shortly after this COJIIIIunication, Benjamin Disraeli, who YU lltill 
at the dawn of his bright political career, wrote his tirat Zionist 
novel, entitled Tucred. 3 
In l84o, a notable English Jew, Sir Moses Montetiore, proposed to 
Lord Palmerston the establishment of a Jewish e.gricul.tural project in 
Palestine. 4 Similarly, in 1860, Ernest Laharanne, Pri"f'ate Secret&r7 to 
Napoleon III, published a brochure, La lfoUTe;J.;e Qp.estiom. d' Orient, in 
which he appealed to the Jews to devote theuelvea to the rehabilitation 
ot Palestine, "under the sacred shield ot France, the emancipator". 5 
In 1878, the British troops l&Dded in Cyprus. Although it was 
lnib, P. 4. 
2 Alem, P. 61. 
3 ~., P. 6o. 
4simon Jargy, Ouerre et Paix en Palestine ou l'histoire du conflit 
isre.elo-arabe, 1211-19()7 (Pa.ria: Editions du Seuil, 1~7}, P. 16. 
5Alem, P. 60. 
8 
meant to be a temporary occupation necessitated by the offensive over-
turea of the Tzar's armies against the Ottoman Sultan, the strategic 
nature of the Suez Canal and its proximity to Cyprus made it a lasting 
one. With the British occupation or ESJPt in 1882 - the nodal point of 
Cyprus-Aden axis, the circle was conveniently closed. 1 
In 1884, the year of the :first congress of the "Lovers of Zion 1 11 
the Russian 'putsch' reaohed the Oasis of Merv in Central Asia, coming 
dangerously close to the borders of India. 2 The British navy came into 
action ••• 
In 1889, the road to India vas once again threatened, in another 
corner of the world: the French were at Fachod&. Once again the British 
uvy came into action ••• At the same time, bargaining& were under way 
for concessions of the Baghdad railway contract. 3 The motive behind 
this project vas apparently, and even ostensibly, beyond a purely com-
mercial enterprise. In :tact, more than one authorized source in Oel"DI&Zl7 
had admitted that the motive behind the railway project vas the German 
preoccupation with a. hypothetical conflict with Britain, in order to 
neutralize the latter's presence on the banks of the Suez Canal. 4 Inci-
dentally, Britain occupied the Suez Canal at the outbreak of the First 
World War, when Turkey entered the war as an ally of Germany. 
The brilliant but eccentric Laurence Olephant, on the other hand, 
came forward with an ambitious plan for the settlement of the Jews on a 
lw_b, P. 4. 
2Ibid. 
3Ibid. 
4Ibid. 
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vast tract of land east of Jordan. An English publicist, with the sup-
port of the British Prime Minister, Beaconsfield, and the Foreign 
Minister, Salisb'I.U'Y', Laurence Olephant contacted the Sublime Port on the 
subject of the creation of a Jewish home in the Ottoman domain of 
Palestine. Negotiations were progressing favourably. However, they 
were interrupted by the deterioration of the Anglo-Turkish relations.1 
Thus, none of the well-meaning efforts of either the gentiles or the 
Jews of the pre-Zionist era gave the desired result. 
Similarly, the efforts of a spiritual Zioni:::t Asher Ginsberg, who 
had rightly prophesied that the establishment of a Jewish state in 
Palestine would inevitably involve compromises and would lead to bitter 
violence, proposed instead the creation of a symbolic spiritual center 
for the Jewish people, in the Promised Land. Although this theory had 
attracted some support from other Jewish intellectuals, such as Martin 
Buber and Juda Magnes, the idea of spiritual Zionism remained stillborn. 2 
Finally, the re-awakening of Jewish national feelings was accel-
erated and intensified by the appearance of the Polish, Bulgarian and 
Serbian national movements. A natione.l language was announced during 
the last part of the 19th century and Hebrew flourished as the literary 
language of Eastern Europe. Thus, the movement was diverted from a 
cultural to a political plane, and modern Zionism was born. 3 However, 
modern Zionism did not as yet succeed in formulating the actual doctrine 
1 Alem, P. 62. 
~acoutoure, Israel et les Arabes, le 3e combat, P. 9. 
~anhun Sokolow, Histor,y of' Zionism 1600-1Q18 (London: Longman&, 
Green and '"Company, 1919) , Vol; I, P. 10. 
1.0 
f th . f th J . h l. • • t 't l. o e regrouping o e ew1s peep e 1n a given erri ory. 
The first Zionist visionaries of the 19th century had a rather 
vague idea about Erzeth Israel. Later, however, the idea assumed a more 
precise form. Even Theodore Herzl, who is considered to be the father 
of Zionism, had not contemplated, in the beginning, the idea of a return 
to Palestine. Perhaps the first who visualized a return to Palestine 
was ~~oses Hess, whose Rom und Jerusalem, in which he quotes extensively 
from La.haranne, was to become a Zionist classic. In 1862, !>toses Hess 
published his brochure in which he foresaw the birth of a Jewish nation 
in Palestine. He was treated as a visionary and frowned upon as a 
dangerous heretic. But, after the pogroms in Russia following the 
assassination of Tzar Alexander II in 1881, the tide was turned in 
favour of his project. 2 
The following year a Jewish doctor of Odessa, Leo Pinsker, pub-
lished the first Zionist manifesto, the Auto-emancipation. 3 This pam-
phlet depicts very clearly the collective psychology of fear and repug-
nance, and the experiences of a people dispersed by the Romans, who were 
now reappearing "under the sinister aspect of the dead walking with the 
4 living." Drawing a rather sad portrait of the phantom people, Pinsker 
asserted that the essential problem of the Jews lay in the acquisition 
of a land. But at the same time they would have to content themselves 
1 Sokolow, P. 10. 
2Ibid., P. 16. 
3Leo Pinsker, L'Auto-Emancipation (Berlin: W. Issleib, 1882), P. 12. 
('I'raduction Fran~aise et introduction de Andr~ Neher, J'rusalem 1960). 
4I • P 8 ~., .. 
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with the illusion of restoring the ancient Judea: 
The actual aim of our efforts should not be the Holy Land but 
a land. We will convey there the idea of' our God and the :Bible: 
they alone made of our ancient land the Holy Land. The rest is 
meaningless, whether Jerusalem or Jordan. 1 
Of course, Pinsker did not object to the idea of re-establishing the 
Jewish nation in Palestine. :But, equally, he envisaged other alterna-
tives, such as Syria and North America~ where vast possibilities for 
colonization existed. 2 However, Pinsker underestimated the enormous 
difficulties that accompanied his proposal. He well understood that his 
plans ca.ll.ed tor years and years of' struggle and forbearance. But he 
admitted that nwhen one has wandered for thousands of years, nothing 
will ever seem too long. "3 
Auto-emancipation contained both the definition and the justif'i-
cation of' Zionism. In later years, Ben-Gurion expressed the idea that, 
"a.s far as the forerunners of modern Zionism are concerned, and the 
force with which this idea hu been expressed, ve must befittingly give 
to Leo Pinsker the first place among the theoreticians of Zionism." 
nThis brochure, Auto-emancipation continues to be the most remarkable 
cla.ssic of Zionist literature. "4 When Theodore Herzl came upon this 
brochure, he declared that had he read it sooner, he would not have 
1-pinsker, P. 8. 
2 Alem, P. 64. 
Jpinsk.er, P. 15. 
4 David Ben-Gurion, Le Peupl~. et l'Eta.t d'Isra.el (Paris: Les 
Editions de Minuit, 1959), P. 20. 
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written his pamphlet The Jewish State.1 
However~ it was not Auto-emancipation which ushered in the Zionist 
revolution. The brochure was read throughout Europe, but it aroused more 
reservations than interest. This, too~ "was laughed away as a whimsical 
aberration."2 The majority of people were not yet reaay to accept the 
ineluctable character of anti-semitism. Far from being discouraged by 
the critics, Pinsker was determined to transform his ideas into concrete 
actions. Thus, in 1884, the first Congress of the "Lovers of Zion" 
(Hoveri Sion) took place in the city of Pinsk under the auspices of Leo 
Pinsker. It was founded to reorganize Jewish emigration from Russia. 
This congress is generally considered as the point of departure of the 
movement, if not the very idea of poli tioa.l Zionism. 3 Soon afterwards 
the ramifications of this society's activities spread all over Eastern 
Europe and resulted in the financing of important operations. With 
Pinsker's help, the students' association ~illu was formed in Jaffa and 
thus the first Aliy·a was created. Subsequent persecutions in Russia in 
1890 and 1891, particularly the expulsion of the Jews from l<foscow, rein-
forced the first Aliya with new and more experienced contingents.4 
The kernel of a 'Jewish nation' and the idea that it could not 
exist without a territory, is explicit in Pinsker's train of thought, 
when he asserts that, "we have to give up the foolish illusion of 
1Theodore Herzl, ,!he Complete Diaries of Theodore Herzl (Uew York: 
Thomas Yoseloff, 1960), 5 Vol.~ P. 38. 
2 Alem, P. 70. 
3sokolow, P. 49. 
4 Al.em, P. 67. 
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accomplishing the Providential mission through dispersion. As long as we 
don't have a home like other nations, we have to give up that noble hope 
of becoming men like others."1 "Only self-emancipation of the Jewish 
people as a nation would have any effect on our situation. The inter-
national Jewish question must have a national solution."2 
Birth of Political Zionism. -:-As the first immigrants ' Ody'sfe;r 
came to an end at the toot of the rugged hills of Judea, political 
Zionism was officially born with the intervention of Theodore Herzl. 
A magistrate, a writer and a journalist, Theodore Herzl, a native 
of Budapest 9 belonged to the Venetian bourgeoisie. His secondary 
education had been in a Christian school. He was the intellectual Jew 
who was assimilated in Central Europe. At the beginning of his career, 
Herzl thought that assimilation was the best solution of the Jewish 
Question. Therefore, he advocated a general baptism of the Jewish 
people a 
The idea of a general baptism ia half serious and half joking. 
I allow myself to say, that I do not want to be baptised. But will 
someone give it to my son, Hans? We must baptise our children vhen 
they are incapable of thinking and when they cannot approve of being 
either for or against. We must find ourselves among the people.3 
However, in 1894, while in Paris to report on the proceedings of 
the Dreyfus trial for an Austrian newspaper, the unfortunate outcome of 
4 this trial convinced Herzl of the contrary. He emphatically stated two 
lpinsker, P. 10. 
2Ibid. 
l.aerzl, Diaries, P. 27. 
4 Jargy, P. 18. 
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years later, in his famous pamphlet _The J ewis~ate, tb.&t, nthe dis-
tinct nationality of the Jews cannot, would not, (an9} must not 
disappear. "1 
The Jewish State was published on February 4, 1896, in Vienna and 
gave Zionism its real politico-nationalistic character. This new 
insight shaped the whole character of the Zionist movement: "it gave to 
the movement the neo-Rousseauism of a. 'return t~ the land' ". 2 
From the outset, Theodore Herzl had attached great importance to 
the British Jews: "Those energetic Jews to whom I imparted m;y scheme in 
London were the backbone of the "society of Jews" which was to supervise 
the execution of the project. The financial problems involved were to 
be handled from London by the "Jewish Company" set up a.eoording to Eng-
lish law and under the protection of England. Furthermore, the latter 
would be concerned with the liquidation of the properties of those who 
wished to emigrate, and with their re-settlement in the new country. 3 
Regarding the form of government, Herzl had envisaged a. constitu-
tiona.l monarchy or a republic of the aristocracy on the line of Plato's. 
His Utopia. vas to be not only a. Jewish state but a model state as well. 4 
With regard to the territory on which the new Erzeth Israel was to 
be founded, Herzl, an ardent Pa.lestiniat, did not a.t least at this stage, 
m.a.k.e Palestine the ultimate aim of their long pursuit. He had some 
~eodore Herzl, L'Etat Juif (Paris: Editions de Herne, 1969), 
P. 15. 
2 Koestler, P. 38. 
3 Alem, P. 65. 
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difficulty in convincing Ben-Gurion, whose policy vas 'Palestine or 
nothing', that ato succeed in creating a Jewish nation a.nd to have it in 
Z. " . . . 1 1 · J.on · at the same tJ.m.e vas lmpossJ.b e. Hovever, Herzl vas soon to 
shift his attention towards the Promised Land: "the unforgettable a.nd 
historical country whose name alone would constitute a. rallying cry of 
irresistible force."2 
In 1897 Herzl started a. weekly publication called Der Weld, which 
became the organ of the Zionist movement. In the course of the same 
year, Herzl, whose doctrine had a profound effect on the Jewish circles 
in Europe, held the first Zionist congress in Basle, Switzerland. The 
congress adopted a. resolution on the basis of the creation of a 
"national home publicly recognized and legally secured in Palestine. "3 
Two hundred delegates were assembled from all over Europe. It was at 
this congress tha.t the official birth of Zionism was proclaimed a.nd 
Herzl elected a.s the first president. Also, the foundation of a world 
Zionist organization was laid dawn with the aim o:f': ''assuring to the 
Jewish people a national home in Palestine guaranteed by International 
Law. 114 In order to materialize his project, Herzl approached those 
powers which had some innuence on the powerful Jewish communities such 
as Tza.rist Russia and those which had actual control of the coveted 
land: the government o:f' Constantinople. 5 
~erzl, Diaries, P. 27. 
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Up to 1914, Great Britain a.lone among the leading powers shoved 
some serious interest in Zionism, although, in the 1860s~ vhen French 
prestige in the Levant vas at its height, it seemed as though France 
might be disposed to do something for the Jews in Palestine. Nothing 
had come of thia 7 just as nothing had come of Herzl's approach to the 
Kaiser in the late 1890s, when Germany, then doing her best to advertise 
and assert herself in Pa.lestine, had played for a moment vi th the idea 
of a Zionist movement under German patronage and protection.1 Among 
other important personalities whom Rerzl approached were the Grand Duke, 
Frederic de :Bade, the Italian Monarch, Emanuel III, and Pope Pius X. 
Having succeeded in interesting the Grand Duke of Baden, Herzl told him 
that Zionism needed a protector and that Germe.n protection would be more 
2 
welcome than any other. 
During the war of 1914-1918, it we.s to occur to both French and 
Germans that the Zionists might be usetul. friends. However, in the last 
year of peace the Zionists were in disfavour both in Paris and in 
Berlin. The Zionist campaign against the use of German as a language of 
instruction, side by side with Hebrew, in the Jewish educational systems 
in Palestine had irritated the German Foreign Office and Zionism was 
denounced in the German press as the tool of enemies of Germany. 3 
Although Zionism's main strength was Eastern Europe, many of its most 
prominent figures were German Jews or Russian Jews oriented towards 
l Alem, P. 61. 
2 Dib, P. 7. 
3Ibid. 
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Germany by residence in that country or by their education at German 
universities. 1 The seat of the directorate of the Zionist Executive, 
originally in Vienna., was moved in 1905 to Cologne and in l9ll to 
Berlin. .Ul this might have been expected to cause the movement to 
gravitate into the German orbit.2 As international tension increased, 
the Zionist organization~ did, in fact, come to be suspected, both in 
England and France, of being a conscious instrument of' German policy. 
But this was a misjudgement. Up to the outbreak of' war there vas no 
evidence after 1898 of any firendly relations between the Zionist 
leaders and the German government or its representatives in Constan-
tinople.3 
Similarly, Paris was the headquarters of the West European 
branches of the Chibboth Zion (Love of Zion) movement, which has an 
important place in the early Zionist history. The influences thus 
radiating :from Paris might well have been expected to provide the French 
government with assets which it could turn to its advantage. 4 
!Ierzl paid a visit to the man who vas considered to be the founder 
of anti-semitic policies in Russia, Vya.cheslav Plehve, the Interior 
Minister, and succeeded in attracting his interest towards his project. 5 
Most important of all his efforts were, indeed, his difficult, nego-
tiations with Sultan Abdul Hamid II, vhich lasted two years. The Sultan 
1Dib, P. 7. 
2 Alem, P. 62. 
3Ibid. 
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of Turkey had been approached in the meantime, and there seemed some 
chance of his granting a charter of occupation in Palestine to the newly 
formed Zionist organization. The Sultan himself had not been disin-
clined to dispose of Palestine in return for cash. However, the enor-
mous sum he had asked was bey-ond the Zionist means of attainment at that 
period. As the bargaining went on, the Sultan became aware of Moslem 
opposition, which he did not expect, and his enthusium for the sale of 
Palestine was in consequence diminished. 1 
Although deeply disillusioned by this failure. Herzl was, none-
theless, not discouraged. With a new wave of persecutions and the 
Jewish exodus from Rumania., innumerable interventions on behalf of the 
2 Zionist movement had taken place all over Europe. 
For some time Herzl had toyed with the idea. of obtaining terri-
torial concessions in Mozambique or in the Belgian Congo. He parti-
cula.rly turned to Great Britain, in order to benefit from the ardent 
support of Lord Nathaniel Mayer Rothschild, head of the English branch 
of this family. 3 With this project in mind, Herzl contacted Joseph 
Chamberlain, Secretary- of State for the Colonies, in 1902. Not having 
effective rights over Palestine, the British Government was ready to 
consider favourably two concessions: 1) Cyprus, and 2) El-Arish in 
Sinai. 4 The Cypriot solution was rejected by the Zionist Congress. 
However, the offer of El-Arish seemed more attractive, because they felt 
~ib, P. 8. 
2 Sokolow, P. 66. 
3Ibid. 
4 Alem, P. 62. 
1 f'a.lthough it is not Palestine, it is at the gate of' Palestine. 11 In a. 
letter to Lord Rothschild, who had shown some interest in his proposals, 
Herzl suggested that the El-Arish scheme might appeal to the British 
Government, since British inf'luence in the Eastern Mediterranean would 
be strengthened by a "large-scale settlement of our people at a point 
where Egyptian and Indo-Persian interests converge. "2 
On the other hand, Chamberlain wae genuinely concerned about the 
position of' the Jews in Eastern Europe and anxious that Great Britain 
should do something to help them. But Herzl seems to have convinced him 
that the El-Arish in Sinai had also certain attractions :f'rom a British 
point of viev. 3 Hitherto, Chamberlain's interest in Zionism had been 
chief'ly humanitarian; he nov saw in it some positive opportunities f'or 
British policy. :By supporting Zionists, Brit&in could enlist the sympa-
thies of' World Jewry on her behalf. She could also secure Jewish 
capital and settlers for the development of' what was virtually British 
territory. 4 Looking, moreover, to the tuture, a Jewish colony in Sin&i 
might prove a usetul instrument f'or extending British influence in 
Palestine proper. when the time came for the inevitable dismemberment of 
the Ottoman Empire. 5 Chamberlain, who must have had the imperial as 
well as the humanitarian aspects of' the Jewish problem in mind, rea.lized 
that the El-Arish scheme was a forlorn hope. During an official visit 
1sokolow, P. 66. 
2 Jargy, P. 23. 
3Alem, P. 67. 
4Ibid. 
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to East Africa1 in 1902~ soon after his meetings with Herzl, he 
seriously thought that British East A:f'rica might be suitable for a 
Jewish settlement under British auspice. He put this suggestion to 
Herzl upon his return in the Spring of 1903. 2 
In the sixth Zionist Congress in 1903, Herzl proposed that an 
enquiry commission be sent to Uganda. This created the first rift in 
the Zionist Congress. The Russian delegation walked out, with shouts 
of betrayal. At the outset the East African episode left deep scars on 
the Zionist movement and resulted in the resignation of Herzl from the 
presidency of the movement. 3 The opponents of the Uganda project were 
so violent that one student shot at Max Nardau, the publio orator of 
the movement in Paris, who had supported Herzl' s proposition, shouting, 
"death to the African Na.rdau. 114 
The Uganda affair brought the organization to the verge of 
splitting and also left another legacy - a re-affirmation of British 
goodwill towards Zionism. 5 With gratitude to the British Government and 
pride in the enhanced status of the Zionist organization were mingled 
the doubts and miasiVings of those who saw in the proposal the beginning 
1LChe.mberlain vas not thinking of Uganda but of the East African 
protectorate, soon to become the colony of Kenya. He must, however, 
have erroneously mentioned Uganda to Herzl, because in Herzl's Diaries· 
it is written Uganda and not East Africa.] {"cited by") J .M.lf. Jeffries, 
Palestine: the Realit:r (London: Longmans: Green B. Company, 1939), P. 18. 
2 Alem~ P. 67. 
3Herzl, Diaries, P. 53. 
4~~C!· 
5Alem, P. 67. 
of the end of Zionism as a movement dedicated to the creation of a home 
for the Jewish people in Palestine: the connection between the Jews and 
Palestine was the essence of the Zionist Creed. 1 
A year later, on July 3, 1904, Herzl died prematurely at the age 
of 44. 2 
The East African episode ended in 1905. Once again the British 
Government had occasion to interest itself in Zionism, but this time in 
a less friendly spirit. When, af'ter the Turkish Revolution, the Young 
Turks began to veer towards Germany, it was believed in British circles 
in Constantinople that the Zionists were working with pro-German 
elements among the Jews and crypto-Jews prominently associated with the 
Committee of Union and Progress. 3 Reports to this effect which reached 
London from Constantinople in 1910-1912 did the Zionists no good in 
British eyes. In some influential British circles the idea gained 
ground that the Zionists were somehow linked with the Jews behind the 
Turkish Revolution and with the forces interested in swinging Turkey 
into the German orbit. 4 
With the death of Theodore Herzl, the second of Joseph Chamber-
lain's efforts to help the Zionists ended. They were made at a time 
when the arrival in England ot considerable numbers of Jewish refUgees 
had given rise to an agitation against alien immigrants and a demand 
1teonard Stein, The Balfour Declaration (London: Vallentine 
Mitchell, 1961), P. 17. 
2 Alem, P. 67. 
3Jargy, P. 83. 
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that the influx be checked. After an enquiry by a Royal Commission 
on Alien Immigration, certain restrictions on the entry of aliens 
were proposed in a Bill introduced by the Balfour Government in the 
Spring of 1904.1 Though Chamberlain was satisfied of its necessity, 
he seems also to have felt that the Jews, who were thus to be denied 
asylum in England, ought, if possible, to be offered compensation and 
it looks as though this accounts, at least in part, for the East 
African offer. 2 The Balfour Government's Alien Bill became law in 
the summer of 1905. 3 
To say the least, Theodore Herzl, that genuine visionary, re-
ceived the exhalting revelation of hie success ••• "I have founded the 
Jewish state in Basle. I dare not say this in a loud voice, lest it 
should evoke general laughter. In five years, surely in fifty years, 
- - 4 all of you will admit Lwhat I have just said/." 
The Jewish State was proclaimed 50 years and 8 months after the 
First Zionist Congress in Basle. 5 
With reasonable accuracy, it can be stated that the birth of a 
Jewish State did not seem f'easible to the contemporaries of Theodore 
Herzl but the creation of a national home, either in Palestine of else-
where, was a certainty. This is why Theodore Herzl deserves to be 
1
stein, P. 83. 
2 Sokolow, P. 101. 
3stein, P. 84. 
4 Herzl, Diaries, P. 80. 
called the Father of Modern Zionism.1 
Two factors contributed to the success of Herzl's project: the 
Russian pogroms pushed more immi,snmts towards Palestine at a time vhen 
Herzl ns defending his theory in the Diaspora. Thus, pogroms and their 
consequenuas brought simultaneously to the fore the realism of Herzl's 
project and its tragic necessity. Furthermore, the First World War and 
the collapse ot the Ottoman Empire almost miraculously offered Zionism 
the possibility of realization. 2 
Another prominent figure in the Zionist 'Who's Who', is Chaim 
Weizma.nn. He was born in Grod.no, Poland, in 1893; he emigrated to 
England in 1904 in order to complete his studies, and became a natu-
~alized British subject. 3 From his youth, Weizmann had been an active 
Zionist; by 1914, he had risen to a prominent position, though not to 
a C()f!IDI8..nding place, in the Zionist movement • 
With hi& 'Mephisto:phel.ian face and ••• sinister charm' 4 Weismann 
had an unerring instinct tor timing. He vas a political seismograph and 
able to impart to others his mystical faith in the destiny of the Jewish 
people and the significanoe of their survival. During the War, 
Weizmann's scientific achievements enabled him to influence the British 
Government and render invaluable service to his people. 
Weizmann was never under the illusion that Zionism could rely for 
l Alem, P. 68. 
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its success on mystical aberrations. Rather, it must rely on those 
facts that could be shown to accord with British strategic and political 
interests. On October 10, 1914, he conveyed his feelings to Israel 
Ze.ngwill: 
:t<ly pla.ns are based naturally on one cardinal assumption - viz. 
that the Allies will win. I have no doubt in n~ mind that Palestine 
will fall within the sphere of England. Palestine is a natural 
continuation of Egypt and the barrier separating the Suez Canal ••. 
the Black Sea and any hostility which may come t'rom that side •• 
it will be the Asiatic Belgium especially if developed by the Jews. 
We, given more or less good conditions, could easily move a million 
Jews into Palestine within the next :f'itty or sixty years, and 
England would have an effective barrier and we would have a 
country ••• 1 
It would be well to note the pivotal idea of an identity between the 
British interests and that or the Zionist aspiration. 
Furthermore, Weizmann was a remarkable chemist. He was nominated 
Advisor to the Admiralty and Minister or Munitions at a moment when the 
latter was run by Lloyd George. liis discoveries in the field or explo-
si ves rendered the Allies an important assistance. It is said that 
Lloyd George had stated on several occasions that, "the acetone had 
converted me to Zionism. ••2 
In another place Lloyd George writes: 
When our difficulties labout aceton!7 were solved through Dr. 
Weizmann' s genius, I said to him: "You have rendered great service 
to the state, and I should like to ask th~ Prime Minister to recom-
l'JleDd you to his Majesty for some honour." 
To this Weizma.nn replied that he wanted nothing for himself but he would 
1
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like something to be done tor his people. He then vent on to explain 
his aspirations tor the repatriation of the Jewish people in Palestine.1 
It seems that it vas the fount and origin of the famous Balfour 
Declaration, which had consecrated the Jewish national home in 
Palestine. 2 
'Arise ye Arabs and Awake' • 3 -In the 19th century, the Arab world 
passed through a phase of profound evolution, arising trom a conflict 
between nostalgia tor a glorious past and impatience to get rid of the 
Ottoman domination, which vas the source of economic, social and poli-
tical decadence, on the one hand, and the inTasion of Western ideas, 
particularly these of the french Revolution, on the other. The conver-
gence of these elements developed into an extremely explosive 
nationalism. 4 
Long before the conflagration of 1914, and u a reaction against 
the Pantouranism5 of the Arab Provinces preached by the Lords ot 
Istanbul, the formation of diverse political groupe vas constituted; 
sometim.ea they were under cultural or social labels but o:rten, too, with 
clear political ideology. 6 
P. 4. 
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The leaders of such groups were convinced liberals in the Glad-
stonian fashion, deeply attached to the lofty principles of liberty, 
eq,uali ty and national sovereignty. They proclaimed the right of :peoples 
to dispose of themselves and dreamed of a democracy based on social 
justice and highlighted with Arab traditions.1 
The story of the Arab national movement takes place in Syria in 
1847, with the foundation in Beirut of a literary society under American 
patronage. 2 The two prominent figures of this movement were Nasif 
Yaziji and Butrus Bostani, both Christian Arabs of the Lebanon. 3 
In 1860, Bust ani founded a newspaper in Beirut called the Clarion 
of pia, a name sufficiently explanatory of its mission. It was the 
first political journal ever published in the country. In 1870, he 
founded Al-Jenan LThe Garden!?, a fortnightly political and literary 
. 
4 
. tt renew. He gave J. t as a mo o: "Patriotism is an article of faithn; 
a sentiment hitherto unknown in the Arab world. 5 
In the early days of their association with the American Mission, 
Ya.ziji and :Sustani had come forward with a proposal for the foundation 
of a learned society. The project matured in January 1857, when a 
society came into being in Beirut, under the name of 'The Syrian Sci en-
tific Society', which was to elaborate the first coherent Arab political 
~ib, P. 5. 
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1 program. An interest in the progress of the country as a unit was 
their motive; a pride in the Arab heritage their league. Thus, with 
the founding of this society, the first explicit manifestation of a 
• t• nal . • 2 collect1ve na 10 consc1ousness was vo1ced. 
One of the members, Ibrahim Yaziji, a son of the great Nasif 
Yaziji, had composed a poem in the form of an ode to patriotism: Arise 
ye Arabs and Awake. 3 The substance of this poem was an explicit 
incitement to Arab insurgence. His poem was rightly labelled the 
Marseillaise of Arabism. 4 
It would be well to note that at this point Arab national con-
sciousness was only in its embryonic stage and independence was not the 
preoccupation of the 'Syrian Scientific Society'. Rather, the aim was 
to achieve some measures of liberalization. However, this moderation 
was soon to find its radical manifestations in the demands of Najib 
Azoury, a Palestinian, vho founded in 1904 the 'League of Arab Country', 
in Paris. He defined his revolutionary program for the liberation of 
the Arab countries in a book entitled, The Awakening of the Arab Nation, 5 
published a year later in Paris. This is the first outward pronounce-
ment of radical demands for the constitution of' an Arab empire extending 
from. the Tigris and the Euphrates across the Mediterranean Sea, and f'rom 
1Jeffries, P. 25. 
2Ibid. 
3 Azoury, P. 4 • 
4 Alem, P. 71. 
5 Azoury, P. 7. 
--------~--------------------------
28 
the Persian Gulf to the Sinai. 1 Egypt vas excluded from these limits on 
the grounds that 11the inhabitants did not belong to the Arab race. tt2 
Azoury' s Arab empire comprised the Arab Peninsula, Iraq a.nd (its twin 
sister) historical Syria, including Pe.lestine. 3 His project was unani-
mously accepted by all :f'uture Arab nationalists. It marked e. turning 
point in the Arab national movement since the Arab nation was given a 
h • a1 r· . . 4 geograp 1c de 1n1t1on. 
Ironically. a 'National Committee' was founded in Paris by 
Mustapha Pasha Kamel, an Egyptian, who issued a very important document 
in 1895. 5 It vas, in fact, a 11prospecti ve charter of the Arab indepen-
dence, "6 which was never to be lost f'rom sight and vas to re-emerge 
twenty years later under the pen of Sherif Hussein, in Mecca. 
Arab national consciousness which was borne on the wings of a 
renascent literature, in its second phase of conception vas characterized 
by e. shirt :from a principal.l.y cultural activity to a political movement. 7 
A group of young thinkers began an agitation for the liberation of 
their country from Turkish rule. They were the pupils of Yaziji and 
Busta.ni and were the first generation to have been reared on the 
1 Azoury, P. 10. 
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rediscovery of their cultural inheritance. The seed of nationalism was 
sown and a movement was coming into existence, whose inspiration was 
purely Arab and whose ideal was wholly national.1 
It began with the seizure of power by the Young Turks in 1908 and 
lasted until the Ottoman Empire entered the war on the side of Germany. 
The Young Turks, by adopting the liberal program of the 'Committee of 
the Union and Progress' founded in 1894, had rallied the support of all 
non-Turkish subjects of the Empire and had instilled great enthusiasm. 2 
For example, a number of notable leaders of the minority groups had been 
admitted to the new parliament and it was hoped that some profound 
reforms would be enacted. However, much to the disappointment of the 
Arab subjects, the parliament hurriedly reopened a new page of Pantouran-
ism. Instead of putting into effect the promised decentralization, it 
introduced measures of Turkanization in all the Arab Provinces. 3 
The Young TUrks 1 racial enthtUJiasm carried them even further, to 
the re-establishment of a Pre-Islamic Touranian civilization, at the 
risk of crushing the very pillars of the Moslem Empire. Consequently, 
the new oppressive measures towards the Arab subjects, aggravated by 
the deception of the hopes of 1908, embittered the Arabs and accelerated 
the birth of the nationalist movement.4 
While the menace of war vas tmminent and Turkish participation a 
fact, Arab nationalism entered its third phase of existence. The demands 
1 Jargy, P. 23. 
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of ~oderate reforms, of autonomy and of bi-partisanship were transformed 
at this stage into concrete demands for liberty. Thus the policies of 
the 'Societies' were moved from the plane of political vengeance to 
..... . t• •t• 1 suuvers~ve ac ~V1 ~es. 
In the post-Young Turks era, Arab national societies went under-
ground. 'Hizb-Al-Ahd' (Party of the Oath) was perhaps the most powerful 
and dangerous of &ll such societies because its members were all high 
ranking officers of the Ottoman a.rmies. 2 The secret or semi-secret 
'Societies' which worked for Arab independence, or, as a first step, for 
Arab autono~, had grown powerful. The 'Al-Arabiya.h a.l-Fata.h' (Arab 
Youth), wa.s founded in Paris, by Palestinians, one of whom became well 
known later on as Auni Bey Abd-el Hadi, a signatory of the Versailles 
Treaty. 3 
For some time now. Sherif' Hussein of' Mecca, Governor of' the Holy 
Places, had toyed with the idea of recreating the great Arab empire. 
with himself as the Caliph. He was following the political developments 
with keen interest, in case the opportunity should arise for the reali-
za.tion of his objectives. Exactly eight months before the outbreak of 
the war, this intelligent Prince had instructed his eldest son, Amir 
Abdullah, to contact Lord Kitchener, the British High Commissioner in 
Cairo, to find out whether Britain would support the Ara.b cause for 
independence tor Arab support of the Allies. 4 
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CHAPl'ER II 
PALESTINE: THE THRICE 'PROMISED LA.TID' 
The Dismemberment or the Ottoman Empire 
The First World War puts in its proper perspective the personages, 
the :f':ramework and the mishaps of the Palestine drama. The play ot the 
great powers, espeeially' Great Britain, either excited or pacified the 
hopes and ambi tiona or the tvo movements, :making the two proscribed and 
humiliated groups the greedy heirs of the Palestine conrlict. 1 
Until now~ both Zionism and Arab renaissance were kept under the 
shadows of a decaying colonia.lism: the Ottoman Empire. Henceforth, the 
tvo movements were to face the protective shield of a more competent 
imperialism, that of the British Empire, whose ambitions had been 
whetted by French competition in the Middle East. 2 
Either for diplomatic or strategic reasons, four texts of prime 
importance appeared between 1915 and 1918. Forged by the pressures of 
circumstance, dictated by the exigencies of time, these four texts are 
the t'undamenta.l documents in the lexicon of Judeo-Arab conflict. These 
are the exchange of the McMahon-Russein letters (1915); the Sykos-Picot 
Agreement (1916); the Balfour Declaration (1917); and the Declaration to 
the Seven ( 1918}. Each of these documents rill be treated briefly for 
the sake of understanding the underlying causes of the present conflict. 
1 La.coutoure, P. 10. 
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The Mci~on-Hussein Correspondence.--The exchange of correspondence 
took place between Sherif Hussein, King of the Hedjaz, and Sir Henry 
McMahon, the British High Commissioner for Egypt and the Sud&n. Sherif 
Hussein was the most outstanding personality in the Arab world and one 
of the stout exponents of the Arab cause. The exchange of corres-
pondence could be summarised as a British promise of independence to the 
Arabs, in exchange for Arab military support against Turkey. This 
promise included a restriction concerning the Syrian coastal area from 
Damascus to Alexandretta: a precaution by the British authorities to 
f'urther the aims of her a.lly, :France, regarding the Lebanon and Syria. 
However, as ve see later the text of the McMahon Correspondence did not 
exclude Palestine from the Arab boundaries proposed to the British 
Government. 1 
Indeed, the substantial threat of Turkey's entry into the war 
against the allies on the one hand, and, on the other, the possible 
effect of this upon the Moslem subjects of Great Britain and France, if 
Turkey proclaimed a Jehad LHoly war7 constituted Great Britain's 
greatest fear. Although the Moslems of India had gal.lantly responded to 
the Empire' s call to arms against Germ.a.ny, a war against Turkey was a 
tota.lly different matter. It vas, indeed, a crucial issue and Mecca the 
saving point. It was, however, conjectured that, if the probable 
Turkish proclamation of a Jeha.d remained confined to Turkey and did not 
encompass the entire Moslem world, the danger point might pass; the 
only peril lay in a J@b§d supported by Mecca. 2 
1La.coutoure, P. ll. 
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On the wake of the First World War, the two sons of Sherif Hussein 
of Mecca, Amir Abdullah and Amir Fay<;e.l, were in Istanbul as deputies 
trom Jidda. and :Mecca respectively. Amir Abdullah (later King of Jordan) 
expressed his views on the impending war in his memoires: "We saw that 
the Turks hs.d shitted their position and, abandoning their friends, had 
decided to side with the enemies of Russia. nl It was felt then that 
Turkey's motive was to go to war against the allies in order to divert 
the attention ot all non-Turkish subjects away from the pressing demands 
of decentralization. 2 
On the other hand, the members of the 'Suriyya a.l-Fata.h' (the 
Young Syria) Party had met in Damascus to organize a general revolt 
against Turkey, in order to create a unified Arab nation encompassing 
ua.ll ot Syria from Tabuk (in the south), to the Vila.yets of' Aleppo and 
Beirut (in the north); and the governorate of' Jerusalem. n 3 Thus, the 
preoccupations of' the British Empire and the aspirations of the Arab 
peoples converged to pave the way for the famous McMa.hon-Hussein 
4 Correspondence. 
This negotiation launched a new phase of a rather obscure nature, 
during which a. series of' promises were made by both the British 
Government and Sherif' Hussein: Great Britain was concerned to win the 
war and secure the life-line of communications to India. Owing to an 
~g Abdullah of' Jordan, !1ll4emoires Completed (Al-Takmila.) 
(Washington: D.C.: American Council of' Learned Societies, 1954}, P. 32. 
2Ibid. 
3Ibid. 
4 Jargy, P. 22. . .. 
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ano:rnaJ.y of history, the Arabs occupied the region with the most stra-
tegic value, whose acquisition was considered vital to the British 
interests. On the other hand:. the Arabs desired above a.ll the regaining 
of their national independence from the oppressive regime of the 
ottoman. Hence the fate:f'ul Anglo-Arab negotiations, which consisted of 
eight letters exchanged from July 14, 1915, to December 30, 1916.1 
In his first letter, the Sherif of Mecca presented the proposition 
carefully formulated by the Arab nationalist societies, which reclaimed 
the following frontiers: 
Bounded on the north by Mersina.-Aderna up to the 37° of 
latitude, on which degree falls Birijiks, Urfa, Mardin, Midiat, 
.A:madia Islands, up to the border of Persia; on the east by the 
borders of Persia up to the Gulf of Basra; on the sou:th by the 
Indian Ocean, with the exception of the position of Aden to remain 
as it is1 on the west by the Red Sea. the Mediterranean Sea up to 
Mersina.~ 
It was stated, furthermore, as a second condition that the British 
Government should approve and support the procla.mation of' an Arab Cali-
phate of Islam by Sherif Hussein. The third condition stated that 
"Peace was not to be concluded without the agreement of both parties. "3 
To this Sir Henry !kM&hon replied on October 1915: 
Great Britain is prepared to recognize and support the inde-
pendence or the Arabs in a.ll regions within the limits demanded by 
the Sherif or Mecca. 
The Districts of Mersina and Alexandretta and nortions of 
Syria lying to the West of the districts of Damascus: Roms, Home. and 
AlepPQ cannot be said to be purelY .Arab and should be excluded from 
the limits of the dominant provisions of the agreement. 4 
1 
'J arg:r, P. 22. 
2King Abdullah, P. 30. 
3Ibid. 
4Alem, P. 78. 
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It woul.d be well to note that Palestine "lay not West, but South of the 
nl reserved areas. 
On October 31 of the same year, Lord Ki tchener cabled the following 
message to .Amir Abdullah: 
Germany has now bought the Turkish Government with gold, not-
withstanding that England, France and Russia guaranteed the integrity 
of the Ottoman Empire it Turkey remained neutral to war. If the Arab 
nation aaaiat England in this war, England v:ill cuarantee that no 
intervention takes place in .Arabia and will give the Arabs every 
assistance apinst external foreign acg.resaion. It 1118¥ be that an 
Arab of true race will assume the Caliphate at Mecca or Medina, and 
so good come by the help of Ood out of the evil that now is 
occurring.2 
The significance ot this message lies in the tact that Kitchener' s cable 
placed Sherif Hussein in the position ot the representative of the Whole 
Arab world. The negotiations with him becun on the assumption that 
Britain meant negotiation with all the Arabs. 3 Consequently, and as the 
resul.t of the assurances given by Lord Kitchener, Sherif Hussein conveyed 
his otter of rewlt, provided his conditions based on the Damascus 
Program (stated earlier) were met and respected by the British 
Government. A letter to this ettect was sent in August 1916 to the 
Bri tiah High Commissioner in Egypt. This letter "fJJS.Y well be considered 
as the Arab !'fael:a Carta, since it laid the foundation of their 
independence. 4 
~e Arab Women' a Information COI'IIIId. ttee, "'!'he Facta about the 
Palestine Problem," Vol. II, No. l (Januar;r 1969), P. 2. 
2Great Britain, Colonial Ottice, Cmd. 5974 (London: 1939), "Report 
of a committee set up to consider certain correapondence between Sir 
Henry McMahon and the Sherif of Mecca in 1915 and 1916, 11 P. 21. 
3Jargy, P. 26. 
4Jettries, P. 63. 
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On December 30, 1916, McMahon's letter reached Sherif Hussein with 
the pressing message: 
It is most essential that you should spare no efforts to 
attach all the Arab people to our united cause and urge them to 
afford no assistance to our enemies. 
It is on the success ot these efforts and on the more active 
measures which the Arabs may take hereafter in support of our cause, 
when the time tor action comes • that the permanence and strength ot 
our agx-eement must depend.l 
The British Government's pledges were clearly and definitely phrased: 
"Great Britain is prepared to recognise and support the independence ot 
the Arabs within the territories included in the limits and boundaries 
proposed by the Sherif ot !4ecca."2 Palestine waa included in these 
boundaries. It vas on the basis ot these explicit pledges that the Arab 
Revolt was launched. 
The ~ltes-Picot Agreement. -However, only three months after the 
last letter in the McMahon-Hussein Correspondence, and after being 
assured ot the Arab alliance, London turned to Paris, the other 
'receiver' in the Levant. 
The evidently secret agreement between Sir Marks Sykes and Mr. 
George Picot amounted to no less than a scheme tor di Tiding the Levant 
into spheres ot intluence. 3 The Foreign Ottice had instructed Sir Marks 
Sykes to diacuss with Mr. George Picot, who was on a mission to Egypt, a 
plan tor the "definition and delimitation ot French and British 
1Jettriea, P. 83. 
2 Ibid., P. 38. 
~ric Rouleau, Israel et lea Ara'bes, le 3e Combat, P. 11. 
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interests in the Turkish Near East. nl 
Mr. George Picot signed the French agreement on December 21, 1916, 
along the lines of McMahon's reservations: "The French would administer 
the coastal area, while Arab government of the four towns of Homs, Homa, 
2 Damascus and .Aleppo would be under French influence." 
Throwing light on yet another aspect of the Sykes-Picot agreement, 
Lord .Aaqui th states in his Diaries that Lloyd George was extra prudent 
in his attempts "to prevent Palestine tal.ling into the hands of the 
French atheiata."3 
The Balfour Decl&ration.--British political ambitions sought yet a 
third alliance through the publication of the famous Balfour Declaration. 
On November 2, 1917, in a. letter addressed to Lord Walter Rothschild, 
4 Sir Arthur Balfour conveys the following message: 
1 Jeffries, P. 26. 
2Ibid. 
3 Lacoutoure, P. 12. 
4 Stein, P. 15. 
Foreign O:f'tiee, 
November 2nd 1917 
Dear Lord Rothschild, 
I have much plea.aure in eonve;ring to ;rou, on 
behalf of His Majesty's Government, the following deele.:r-
ation of sympathy with Jewish Zionist aspirations which 
has been submitted to, and approved by, the Cabinet. 
"His Majest;r's Government view with favour the 
establishment in Palestine ot a national home tor the 
Jewish people, and will use their best endeavours to 
ta.cili tate the achievement or this obj eet, it being 
clearly understood that nothing shall be done vhieh may 
prejudice the civil and religious rights of existing 
non-Jewish communities in Palestine, or the rights and 
politica.l. status enjoy"ed by Java in any other countr;r" 
I should be gratefUl it you would bring this 
declaration to the knowledge of the Zionist Federation. 
Yours 
Signed: Arthur James Bal.four1 
l -I The exact faesimile of the origina.l. letter reproduced trom 
Leonard-steins' The Balfour Declaration _7 
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The text of this letter vas subsequently incorporated in the San 
Remo Agreement and later in the 95th Article of the stillborn Treaty of 
s~vres. It was also recited in substantially the same terms in the 
Mandate for Palestine as approved by the Council of the League of 
Nations in July 1922.1 
In the Balfour Declaration u Arthur Koestler has it, a simple 
transaction ot land took place, where "one nation sol~ promised to a 
second, the count1'7 of a third. "2 
There have been many conjectures as to the motives behind this 
extraordinary piece of political maater;r. It would be more plausible to 
examine the testimony of one ot the co-authors, Lloyd George, concerning 
"this all time improbable political document. u3 
In the evidence he gave before us, Mr. Lloyd George, who vas 
Prime Minister at that time, stated that, while the Zionist cause 
had been widely supported in Britain and America before November 
1917, the launching ot the Balfour Declaration at that time vas 'due 
to propag&Rdist reasons' i and he outlined the serious position in 
which the Allied and Associated Powers then were. The Rumanians had 
been crushed. The Russian &l'JV vas demoralized. The French a.rnor 
vas unable at the moment to take the ottensi ve on a large scale. 
The Italians had sustained a great defeat at Caporetto. l.U.llions ot 
tons ot British shipping had been sunk by German submarines. No 
American di"f'isions were yet available in the trenches. In this 
critical situation it wu believed that Jewish sympathy or the re-
verse would ll&ke a substantial difference one way or the other to 
the Allied cause. In particular Jewish sympathy would confirm the 
support ot the .American Jewry, and would :make it more ditticult for 
Gel':lll8.D)" to reduce her milit~ commitments and improve her economic 
position on the Easter tront. 
1 llem, P. 85. 
~estler, P. 4. 
3zbid. 
4Great Britain, Palestine Rof!:l Commission Report (London: His 
Majesty's Stationary Office, 1937), P. 17. 
From the beginning of the war, American Zionists and the British 
Government could envisage the consequences of an eventual dismemberment 
of the ottoman Empire.1 The possibility or taking a mortgage in Pales-
tine had also 'been studied. Louis Brandeis, Chief Justice or the u.s. 
Supreme Court and an ardent Zionist , could not take an open part in 
tavour of a Jewish establishment in Palestine, especi&l.ly when his 
country was not at war vi th Turkey. 2 But, by virtue of his high position 
and his personal. friendship, he could persuade President Wilson to convey 
to the British Government the satisfaction that such an attribution would 
bring to American Jewry. The weight of this communication over British 
decision can hardly be over-estimated. 3 
Another factor in the creation ot this declaration, as mentioned 
elsewhere, vas British apprehension of aD7 French establishment in 
Palestine. The French, being convinced ot having an historical right 
over the region, had expressed a desire to obtain a mandate over 
4 Palestine. The English, on the other hand, would not, at any price, 
allow French installation along the Suez Canal, facing the Egyptian bul-
wark situated along the rout:e to India. Sir Herbert Samuel had expressed 
this apprehension in a Cabinet meeting in March 1915: "The establishment 
ot a ueat European power so close to the Suez Canal vill be a permanent 
and formidable menace to the linea ot cOIDJIWlioations so vital to the 
1 Alem, P. 11. 
2Ibid. 
3 Ibid. t P. 18. 
4 Jargy, P. 30. 
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Empire."1 
This view vas confirmed by Sir Marks Sykes, who pointed out in a 
speech on March 18 that French activities in Syria revealed a disguised 
threat to vital British interests, since "the policy of the French 
financiers would eventually destroy the Ottoman Empire,"2 and the 
British Government would confront a "European frontier in the Sinai 
peninsula."3 
A third factor in the successfUl launching of the Balfour Declar-
a.tion was the Russian Revolution or 1917. The Bolshevik Government 
welcomed the idea of a Jewish settlement in Palestine, and endorsed the 
Balfour Declaration. It had hoped, that a socialistic Jewish nation 
along the Soviet line might eventually be formed in the Middle East. 
However important the elements, it is not any less significant that 
the successful endorsement or this unique document may be attributed to 
the romantically sentimental outlook of its co-authors: Lloyd George, 
Lord Balfour, and General Smuts's .tX>(:jtical inspiration created a pol-
itical document in the Old Testamentarian mould: "to assume in one 
glorious moment, the role of messianic Providence. "4 
The wording of this document .is even more contusing than the 
motives which caused such unprecedented meddling. The Royal Commission 
says: "It is clear to us that the words 'the establishment in Palestine 
or a National Home' were the outcome of a compromise between those 
--~--·------·-··-·------
l Alem, P. 77. 
2 Stein, P. 49. 
3Ibid. 
4Koestler, P. 7. 
ministers who contemplated the ultimate establ.iahment of a Jewish State 
and those who did not. nl 
General Smuts, a member of the Imperial War Cabinet, understood 
the 'National Home' in quite a different ~: " ••• in generations to 
come a great J evish state rising there once more. "2 Winston Churchill' a 
de:fini tion of this nege bl.a:nc is even more ambiguous: 
When it is asked what is meant by the development of a Jewish 
National Rome in Palestine, it may be answered that it is not the 
imposition of a Jewish nationality upon the inhabitants of Palestine 
aa a whole, but the turther development of the existing Jewish 
coJII!lnnity ••• in order that it may become a center in which the 
Jewish people as a whole may take, on groundll of religion and race, 
an interest and pride. 3 
However, the Arabs were promised that nothing would be done in Palestine 
to "prejudice their civil and religious rights. "4 
In the final anaJ.ysia, the Bal.fo\U' Declaration vas not received 
without disdain in the capi tala of ll'rance and Italy. Their interest in 
Palestine had already been recopized by the British Government. French 
interest had been secured under the Sykes-Picot agreement and the 
Italians were given the assurances contained in the ·Conference of St. 
Jean de Ma.urrienne. 5 Furthermore, both the French and the Italians had 
been at war with Turkey; France from the start of the hostilities and 
Italy at a later stage, when it became a party to the secret treaties on 
1Great l3ri.tain, Palestine Royal Commission, P. 18. 
2zbid. 
3 Ibid." P. 24. 
4 Koestler, P. 10. 
5Stein, P. 54. 
the dismemberment or the ottoman Empire.1 
On the other hand, the United States was not at war with Turkey, 
and the eventual oo1lapse or the Ottoman Empire did not constitute her 
major concern. It was this ver:r lack or interest in the eventual 
dismemberment ot the ottoman Empire that created an obstacle to an 
American endorsement or the Balfour Declaration. The American Secretary 
ot state, Robert Lansing, in a letter to President Wilson on December 13, 
1917, urged the President "to resist the pressure ot the American 
Zioniste tor a public expression ot American approval. "2 He reminded the 
President that: 
We are not at war vi th Twritey, and therefore should avoid a.ny 
appearance ot taking terri tory from that &rxpire by force. Second, 
the Jews are by no means a unit in the desire to re-eatab1ish their 
race as an independent people ••• Third, ID.&llY Christian sects and 
individual.a would undoubtedly resent turning the Holy Land over to 
the absolute control ot the race credited with the death of Christ. 
For practical purpoaes, I do not think tb.a.t we need go :fUrther than 
the tirst reason given, since that is ample ground for declining to 
announce any policy in regard to the tiDal disposition of Palestine. 3 
Shortly atter this communication, however, President Wilson vas 
induced by Chief Justice Brandeis to endorse the Declaration. 4 
The Declaration to the Seven.--Thia document is the moat important 
and the least k.nOVll statement of policy made by Great Britain regarding 
the .Arab Revolt. It is in fact a re-attirmation ot Great Britain's pre-
vioua pledges to the Arabs, based on an authoritative enunciation of the 
1
a.ein, P. 78. 
2 Jef'tries, P. 80. 
3Ibid. 
4Ibid. 
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principles on which those pledges rested. 1 
In short, the statement defined British policy for the tuture of' 
the regions claimed by Sherif' Hussein as the area of legitimate Arab 
independence. With regard to Syria, Iraq a.nd Palestine, the Declaration 
contained two important assura.nces: 
1) that Great Britain would continue to work. not only 
tor the liberation of' those countries tram Turkish 
oppression but also tor their independence; 
2) that Great Britain would ensure that no system of 
government would be set up in the countries involved 
that was unacceptable to the inhabitants. 2 
The Declaration to the Seven, made public to the Arab represen-
tati vee on June 16, 1918, by the Foreign Office, had a decisive ef'tect 
in dispelling the doubts and apprehensions aroused by previous agree-
menta. 3 (See Appendix for turther detail on the Declaration to the 
Seven). 
l 
:Alem, P. 79. 
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CHAPTER III 
HIGH HOPES AND DISILLUSIONMENT 
The Versailles Peace Treaty.--With Turkey's signing or the armis-
tice on October 28, 1919, at Uoudros, all of the former territories of 
the Ottoman Empire were liberated. Immense hopes had stirred Arabs and 
Jews alike. They had been victorious in their battles and they were 
awaiting the rewards of their saeririees. However, for Britain, it was 
the most trying moment in her history: at this hour of truth, the 
British Government was confronted with the task of fUlfilling its contra-
dictory promises of the Holy Land to both Zionism and Arab nationalism. 1 
The tuture destiny of the former Arab provinces of the Ottoman 
Empire was inscribed on April 25, 1919, in Article 22 of the League of 
Nations. It was the darkest moment in the millenary history of the 
Levant, for the establishment in Palestine of a Jewish state was guaran-
2 teed by the Great Powers. 
Turkey's defeated territory was exactly the area desired by the 
Arabs and its boundaries coincided with the natural limits of Arab 
independence defined by Sherif Hussein. However, contrary to the promise 
made and the principles upheld by the Allies as the basis for future 
peace, Great Britain and France did not hesitate to impose a settlement 
upon the Arabs. 3 Thus, upon his arrival in Paris in January 1919, as the 
l Alem, P. 100. 
2 Jargy, P. 38. 
3Jeffries, P. 88. 
spokesman of the Hedja.z delegation, Amir Fay~a.l was confronted with 
three forces working against the fulfilment of Arab aspirations: 
(1) British interests in Iraq and Palestine, (2) French imperial 
interests in Syria, (3) Zionists' national interest in Palestine.1 
Instructed by his father, Amir Fa.y~al claimed, in recognition of 
their services, the independence of the area promised by McMahon: 
from the line of' Alexandretta-Diarbl!kir to the Indian Ocean. "2 
... 
On the other hand, headed by Chaim Weizmann, as the English repres-
entati ve, and Rabbi Wise as the American spokesman of' Zionism. the 
Zionist delegation claimed the following: 
l) Recognition of' the historical title of the Jewish people 
over Palestine. 
2) Definition of the frontiers of' Palestine from the River 
Litani in the north circumscribing the basin of Jordan and a part 
or Yarmouk, Hernon and Houran; in the east, all along the Bagdad-
Hedjaz railway; and the Gulf' or Aqaba in the south. 
3) Great Bri t&in e.s the mandatory power over Palestine. 
4) The adoption or a political, economic and administrative 
clause to assure the establishment of' a Jewish National Rome and to 
make the eventual creation of' an autonomous state possible.3 
There was yet another battle being waged between Great Britain and 
France over the execution ot the Sykes-Picot Agreement. Arter the 
Bolshevik Revolution, Russia denounced this agreement. Lloyd George, the 
other signatory to the .Agreement. was inclined to follow suit, for two 
reasons: (l) under the Agreement the Vila.yet of Mosul. with its rich 
~alter La.queur, The Road to Jerusalem: the Ori ins of' the Arab-
Israeli Conflict 126I (New York: The MacMillan Company, 19 , P. 20. 
2 
.Alem, P. 104. 
3 ~., P. 106. 
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oil fields, was assigned to France, (2) Palestine wa.s to be under an 
international regime; this would have gravely hindered Great Britain 
from having a free hand in Palestine.1 
However, France rejected the annulment of the Agreement. As a 
result, Lloyd George, upon Clemenceau's insistence proposed that, in 
return for ceding Mosul and Palestine to Great Britain, France should 
have a guid pro quo compensation~ including substantial oil concessions 
:f'rom Mosul. 2 
T)le Weizmann-Fe.ygal Accord.-The controversial accord to which so 
much importance has been attributed was, in fact, no more than a hos-
pitable gesture on the part of Amir F~Qal toward the Jewish people. 
Furthermore, in 1919, there was as yet no question of an independent 
'Jewish state' being created in Palestine but simply the creation of a 
few Jewish colonies and the acceptance of a certain number of Jews who 
would be allowed to live peacetu.lly in Palestine. Amir FayQal ws.s per-
suaded by Lawrence to sign the treaty in January 1919; this amounted to 
a treaty of friendship between Arabs and Jews. However, F~Qal appended 
a significant statement in Arabic: 
If the Arabs obtain their independence according to the con-
ditions spelled out in my diary on January 4, 1919, addressed to the 
British Foreign Secretary, I will give effect to the substance of 
this accord. In the case of the slightest modifications, I will no 
longer be 'bound by a single word. The accord will not be valid and 
will be nullified, and I will not be responsible for any engagements.3 
The King=Crane Commission.--An independent American mission carried 
1Jeffries, P. 89. 
2 Alem, P. 114. 
3 Jargy, P. 4o. 
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out by Dr. Henry King and Charles Crane began an investigation in June 
1919 in Jaffa, which took them to all parts of Syria, including Pales-
tine. The investigation lasted for six weeks and the commissioners 
presented their findings on June 28, in Paris.1 
The King-Crane Report is an outstanding document vi th regard to 
the Palestine conflict. The commissioners recommended a mandatory 
system for Syria-Palestine and Iraq, on condition that the mandate be 
tor a limited period and that the mandatory should aim at bringing the 
territories to independent status; that the unity of Syria, including 
Palestine, be preserved; that &.constitutional monarchy for Syria, with 
Amir FS\Y<;al as king, be proclaimed; and that another Arab sovereign be 
2 
chosen. by plebiscite, to rule over Iraq. 
Concerning the choice of mandate, the Report indicated that the 
consensus of opinion in Syria was in favour of assistance by the United 
States or Great Britain but not by France. With regard to Zionism, the 
King-Crane Commission felt bound to recommend that the Zionist program 
should be greatly reduced, Jewish immigration definitely limited and the 
very idea of making Palestine into a Jewish commonwealth abandoned, since 
they were convinced that the Zionists looked forward to a practically 
complete dialodging of the non-Jewish inhabitants of Palestine. 3 They 
further stated that, even if it were achieved within the form of law, it 
would be a gross violation of the rights of the people and the principles 
1 Alem, P. 115. 
2Ibid. 
3Ibid. 
proclaimed by the Allies. 1 
Despite this candid a.nd f'orcef'ul statement, the King-Crane recom-
mendation was ear-marked f'or oblivion; and Great Britain and France 
imposed a 'settlement' of' their own choice over the Arab countries. 
The San Remo Conf'erence.--on 25th April, 1919, the Supreme Council 
met at San Remo. Decisions regarding the former territories of' the 
Ottoman Empire were taken, to the ef'f'ect that the entire area lying 
between the Mediterranean Sea and the Persian frontier was to be placed 
under mandatory rule. 2 Syria was to be broken up into three parts: 
Palestine, the Lebanon and, of' what was left, a reduced 'Syria' • They 
were disposed so as to suit the ambitions of' each of' the mandatory 
Powers. 3 These decisions were made public on~~ 5th and their promul-
gation gave birth to a new sentiment in the Arab world: contempt f'or 
4 Western Powers. Moreover, it was the starting point of' a new chapter in 
the history of' the Arab Movement - insurgence against the powers of' the 
West. 5 
As later developments proved, poli tica.lly, the decisions were 
unwise in that they ran counter to the deepest wishes of' the people con-
cerned and to a tide of' national consciousness which the war and the 
defeat of' the Turks had swelled to a level from which there could be no 
~avid Hunter Miller, . 
Longma.ns, Green and Company 1 
2Ibid., P. 118. 
3Ibid., P. 116. 
4Ibid. 
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receding. On the moral plane. they stand out as one of the more 
flagrant instances of international diplomacy, in which the breach of 
faith was all the more reprehensible in that it provoked armed resis-
tance and an unpredictable toll of human life and suffering. In 
addition, it violated the very principles, regarding the treatment of 
weaker nations • that the mandates were originally created to serve. 1 
~iller, P. 116. 
CHAPI'ER IV 
PALESTINE UNDER 'PAX BRITANNICA' 
The basic principle of the British Mandate over Palestine vas 
determined during the Conference at San Remo on April 20, 1920. This 
t~date imposed on Britain the general obligations toward the Arabs 
dictated by the League of Nations. On the other hand, Britain's specific 
obligations toward the Jews were dictated by the promise of' the Balfour 
Declaration. This is the reason f'or the continuation in the Levant of 
contradictory engagements by the West. 1 
On September 29, 1923, the British Mandate came formally into 
effect. Article 2 o:f the Covenant laid down that: 
The Mandatary shall be responsible :for placing the country 
under such political, administrative and economic conditions as will 
secure the establishment of the Jewish National Home, as laid down 
in the preamble, and the development o:f self-governing institutions 
and also :for safeguarding the civil and religious rights of all the 
inhabitants o:f Palestine, irrespective o:f race or religion.2 
The Mandate "showed complete disregard for the 90 per cent Arab 
majority in Palestine b.y referring no less than :fourteen times to the 
Jews or Jewish institutions, whereas the Arabs were never mentioned. "3 
Thus, the progress of' Zionist colonization during the Mandate became for 
the Arab national outlook a culminating stroke in a prolonged series of' 
breaches of :faith. 
1 Alem, P. 129. 
2John Davies, The Evasive Peace {New York: The Mentor House, 1937), 
P. 46. 
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The growing Arab opposition to the Mandate and the ensuing riots of 
1920 and 1921 resulted in a British Government White Paper. In June 1922, 
winston Churchill, the then Secretary of State for the Colonies, issued a 
policy statement, or White Paper, stating that: 
While it reaffirmed the Balfour Declaration, he announced that 
the British Government had no intention that Palestine should become 
'as Jewish as England is English' ; that it did not contemplate the 
subordination of the Arab population, language or culture~ that 
immigration would not exceed the economic absorptive capacity of the 
country, and that the special position of the Zionist Executive did 
not entitle it to share to any degree in the government of the 
country.l 
Despite the above statement, in the few years which covered the 
tenure of office of Sir Herbert Samuel, Lord Plumer, Sir John Chancellor, 
Sir Arthur Wauchope and Sir Harold MacMichael, the Jews. who in 1921 did 
not number more than 100,000, increased to 450,000. They had acquired 
control of most of' the fertile plain, as well as the uncultivated land 
from Beer Sheba to Lake Hulah. 2 
In 1937, the Royal Commission, after making a thorough assessment 
of the situation. re&l.ized that the Mandate vas unworkable. It concluded 
that partition was the only way out of the impasse which, "if it offers 
neither party all it wants, offers each what it wants most, namely 
freedom and security ••• and the inestimable boon of peace. "3 In other 
words, partition meant "that the Arabs must acquiesce in the exclusion 
from their sovereignty of a piece of territory long occupied and once 
1Great Britain, Palestine R al Commission Re ort, Cmd. 5479 
(London: His ~~jesty's Stationary Office, 1937 , P. 200. 
~avies, P. 40. 
3Great Britain, Palestine Royal Commission, Cmd. 5479, P. 206. 
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ruled by them. · 
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Moreover, in 1937 the Peel Commission "recognized the British prom-
2 ises to Arabs and Jews as irreconcilable and the ~Andate as unworkable; 
it defined as the objective the establishment of a Jewish state and an 
Arab state, through partition. The British Government endorsed the Royal 
Commission's findings and appointed a fUrther commission to work on the 
details of a partition plan. However, this commission, finding the 
country in the throes of an open Arab rebellion, reported that no prac-
ticable plan of partition could be worked out. 3 
In 1939, the White Paper known as the McDonald Memorandum stated 
that the objective of the British Government was the establishment of an 
independent Palestinian state within ten years. The White Paper categori-
cally stated that nHis Majesty's Government now declares unequivocal.l:y 
that it is not part of its policy that Palestine should become part of 
4 the Jewish state." The Jewish reaction to the White Paper can be summed 
up by David Ben-Gurion: ''We shall tight with Great Britain in this war as 
it there were no White Paper. And we shall tight the White Paper as if 
there were no war."5 
In the final analysis, in the words o:f' Arthur Koestler, 
What both Jews and Arabs believed to be a 'diabolic policy' was 
in fact the traditional muddling-along policy, guided by some vague 
1Great Britain, Palestine Rozal Commission, Cmd. 5479, P. 215. 
2Ibid. 
3Ibid. 
4 Davies, P. 30. 
5navid Ben-Gurion, Israel, ann~es de lutte (Paris: Falnunarion, 
1954), p. 103. 
,-l )L., 
notions of balancing the power of Arabs and Jews, and maintaining as 
far as possible the status quo. But the whole point of the .Balfour 
Declaration was to upstt the balance by transforming Arab Palestine 
into a Jewish country. 
In April 1947 Britain at last capitulated and na.sked that the 
question of the Mandate should be placed on the agenda of the next 
regular session of the United Nations General Assembly. "2 
The British had declared their intention of leaving Palestine by 
May 15, 1948. On that day the Mandate would end and juridically there 
would be a vacuum, since, as a preliminary to the establishment of the 
successor states, Britain retused to share responsibility with the 
United Nations during the Mandate. 
Erskine Childers has thus summed up the British policy in Palestine: 
Forcibly to detach a people from their historic kinsfolk 
(Palestinians thought of themselves as part of Arab Syria), solemnly 
to declare that this detachment was in order to raise them to self-
determination, yet forcibly to impose upon them an alien community 
seeking to make their land 'as Jewish as England is Engll,h' this was 
and is without precedent or parallel in the twentieth century. 
Nowhere in colonial Asia was anything so provocative attempted. 
Palestine was to become a. cancer unique in Western-nationalist eon-
niets.3 
The Partition Plan.--On November 29, 1947, the General Assembly of 
the United Nations recommended the partition of Palestine into two 
states: a Jewish and an Arab state, with the possibility of an economic 
union. 4 
lxoester, P. 17. 
2 Alem~ P. 170. 
~rskine Childers, The Road to Suez (London: McGibbon and Kee, 
1962), P. 65. 
4 Alem, P. 170. 
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The details of the voting process are well known; the United 
Nations Partition Plan came about by virtue of the votes of the Client 
States who, under the pressure put by the Zionists and Zionist sympa-
l thisers of the United States, were obliged to vote for this plan. It 
would be well to look at some reflections on the outcome of the vote. 
The Canadian delegation admitted: 'lWe choose the partition with a heavy 
and worried heart"; 2 the Belgian Foreign Minister hesitantly stated: 
nwe are not sure that this solution is altogether just • • • we are not 
even sure if it is practicable ••• but what other choice can we make? It 
is this solution, or none at all.. ''3 
Nonetheless, the United Nations partition recommendation o:f 1947 
heralded the cataclysm. The decision had given the Zionists, who held 
less than seven per cent of Palestine, about :fitty-five per cent of the 
4 
country. Moreover, the United Nations decision wa.s a revolutionary one 
designed to effect a radical redistribution in :favour of the Zionists. 
To succeed, the Zionists had to revolutionize the status quo; and action, 
initiative as well as armed attack were therefore the sine qua ~ tor 
the realization of the Zionist objectives. 5 
For the Arabs, as well as for the rest of the Asian countries • the 
United Nations' decision took on the sense o:f a new 'crusade' by the 
~deau, P. 68. 
2Cbilders~ P. 72. 
3Ibid. 
4 Jargy, P. 43. 
5James G. McDonald, !1Y !IJ.ssion to Israel (!lew York: Simon and 
Schuster, 1951), P. 145. 
west, in imposing their wish on the Orient, despite their solemn affir-
mation regarding the right of self-determination of the people and their 
. t 1 sovere~gn y. 
The day that Palestine was abandoned by the British fell on a 
Saturday, May 15, 1948. The Jewish authorities, in order to observe 
their Sabbath proclaimed the State of Israel before sunset. It was pro-
claimed at 16 hours and 15 minutes by Ben-Gurion, in the Tel Aviv Museum 
where the ceremony was to take place, and the white and blue flag with 
the star of David was raised. For the Jews, this fatetul date ushered 
in the proclamation of the State of Israel and for the Arabs, the pro-
nouncement of war. 
In the last analysis, the United Nations vote on the Partition of 
Palestine "in part was dictated by anxiety to offer a ref'u.ge to the dis-
placed people, created the further problem of the refugees and therefore 
l t art f •t al • • • • n2 os a great p o ~ s mor JUSt~f~cat~on. 
The Aftermath.--The logical consequence of the proclamation of the 
State of Israel in 1948 was a breaking out of the hostilities known as 
the First Arab-Israeli War, during which many innocent lives were sacri-
ficed and a minimum of "750,000 Arab refugees created."3 Consequently, 
the United Nations formed a new organ in order to deal with the problems 
of the Palestinian refugees. 
The Formation of the United Nations Emersenc1 Force.--In the early 
spring of 1948, the Security Council took its first action on the 
~cDonald, P. 90. 
2 Alem, P. 197. 
~he Economist, Vol. CCXXIV, No. 6462 (July, 1967), P. 20. 
question of Palestine. This action was prompted by the increasing 
violence and political deterioration in the Middle East. Faced with the 
resulting difficulties, the Security Council adopted a Resolution (6147, 
April 1948) calling for a cease-fire in Pa1estine.1 
The ensuing violence was dire.ctly connected with the General 
Assembly's Partition Plan for Palestine (Resolution 181 (II), 
29 November, 1947). This called for the creation of a Jewish state and 
an Arab state in Palestine: with economic union, and an international 
administration for Jerusalem. The plan was vehemently rejected by both 
the Arab states and the Palestinians and violence broke out when the 
Arab states resisted its implementation. 2 
Meanwhile. the General Assembly, in its Second Special Session 
(Resolution 186 ES-II), appointed a mediator, Count Folke Bernadette, to 
cooperate with the Truce Commission in Palestine. 3 When hostilities 
broke out between the Arab states and Israel, after the latter's procla-
mation of' the State of Israel on May 15, 1948) the Truce Commission asked 
for militar.r assistance and advisers. The Security Council, on May 29, 
1948, pursuant to achieving a cease-fire in the area, decided that the 
UN mediator and the Truce Commission should jointly supervise the cease-
fire. From this action came into existence the United Truce Supervision 
Organization (UNTSO), which stayed in operation in the Middle East for 
lunited Nations, General Assembly, The United Nations Emergens:z 
Force (A/3276, November 4, 1950), P. 3. 
2Ibid. 
~.L.14. Burns, Between Arab and Israeli (New York: Ivan Obolensky, 
Inc., 1963), P. 187. 
1 twenty years. The General Assembly, on November 4, 1950, under the 
terms of the "Uniting for Peace Resolution", adopted a resolution for a 
plan for a United Nations Emergency Force; the General Assembly: 
Requests, as a matter of priority, the Secretary-General to 
submit within forty-eight hours a plan for the setting up, with the 
consent of the nations concerned, of an emergency international 
United Nations Force, to secure and supervise the cessation o~ 
hostilities in accordance with all the terms of the aforementioned 
(November 2) resolution.2 
A brain-child of the Canadian delegation headed by Mr. L.B. Pearson, 
the November 4 Resolution vas adopted with 57 votes in favour, 0 against, 
and 19 abstentions, including the USSR;3 and UNEF vas created. 
1 Burns, P. 187. 
~nited Nations, General Assembly~ The United Nations Emergency 
Force, P. 3. 
3 Burns, P. 187. 
CHA.P.rER V 
ARAB COUNTRIES AND ISRA..EL IN THE COLD WAR 
The 'Palestine Conflict' Enters the International Scene.--In the 
post-war era, the Middle East was looked upon exclusively as a strategic 
and military area. It seems that, to the West, at least, this region 
constituted a continuation of the NATO defense system established in 
Europe to guarantee Western :petrol, as vell as other economic interests, 
against the Soviet Union. Perhapa, it vas also designed to safeguard 
the sovereignty of young emerging states against Communist infiltration. 
But, unfortunately, true to the dictates of their tradition and customs, 
the Western powers considered the Middle East a.s their exclusive fief, 
and even as a private hunt.1 'l'herefore, it is not surprising that the 
Palestinian contlict i tselt vas trom the beginning, only a secondary 
part of this global strategy. The solution to the :problem of the 
retugees, in a purely economic context, had to be conceived within the 
framework of an organization for the common defense of the Middle East, 
2 
under the aua:pices of the West. 
Post-war conditions had alre~dy defined and accentuated certain 
profound rivalries and divergences between the three Western powers 
interested in the Middle East. The Anglo-Saxona made an effort to 
eliminate France from the Eastern scene and Anglo-American economic 
1 Jargy, P. 100. 
2 Ibid., P. 99. 
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competition virtually excluded any Soviet interest in the area. But, 
political flirtations on the part of some of' the major Arab countries 
with the USSR rendered obsolete and soon ineffective the joint efforts 
of' the Western powers in the Middle East. 1 
Western rivalries existed parallel to the Arab-Israeli conflict. 
The Anglo-American design was to include the Middle East in an anti-
Soviet defense system which would extend the Atlantic Pact. The United 
States, persuaded by Great Britain to assume responsibility in the 
Middle East, in order to secure American and Western interests in the 
area, established a security system to check the Soviet threat. This 
was the M.E.D.o. {Middle East Defense Organization) project which had 
absorbed Western diplamaey since 1950. 2 
The Baghdad Pact.--For a proper functioning of this project, it was 
necessary to obtain the adherence of the Islamic countries in the Middle 
East. A first step was accomplished by the conclusion of the 1954 Turko-
Pakistani Pact. The two ends of the Islamic world had rallied. The 
participation of the rest was of prime importance. However, for Arab 
countries to enter the Ankara-Karachi alliance, it was becoming impera-
tive first to solve the Palestinian problem. Israel, too, had to find 
its place among the Arabs. On the other hand, it was necessary that no 
Arab state should be tempted to use against Israel, weapons delivered 
by Western powers. lio adherence meant no armament from the West. 3 
Later developments seem to indicate that it was a psychologicaland 
1Jargy, P. 99. 
2Ibid. 
3Ibid. ~ p. 100. 
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ta.etica.l mistake of the vleet to miscalculate the reactions of Arab 
opinion, especially the belief that the Arab Oovernm.ents vould accede 
confidentially to such an alliance, by-passing the Arab masses. 1 
~.1emories of Arab struggles against Western domination and the First 
Arab-Israeli war vere too vivid to allow such historical and psycho-
logical factors to be ignored. 2 For the Arabs, Israel remained the 
arch-enemy. Coll11J1unism and the USSR, by comparison, were distant 
threats 11 not to be heeded; indeed, a. t\lnda.mental optical dif:fe1•ence 
betveen the Occident and the Orient. 
Egypt, as one of the principal Arab countries, remained opposed to 
the plan. On the other hand, Britain succeeded in persuading its 
staunch ally, the Iraqi Prime Minister~ Nouri Said, to announce in 
February 1955 the adherence of his country to the Ankara-Karachi de-
fense pact, christened henceforward, the Baghdad Pact. 3 For Egypt, the 
Baghdad Pact was tantamount to a camouflage; for the Soviet Union, 
4 however, a. sheer provoc~tion. 
France denounced this dea.l. She warned the West of tbe dangers 
involved in such a rash decision to put pressure on the Iraqi Government 
to adhere to the Anglo-American defense system. According to Paris, 
public opinion in Iraq, as well as elsewhere in the Arab world, vas not 
prepared to accept the hurried entry of Arab countries into a Western 
1 Ja.rgy~ P. 102. 
2IbJA· 
3
_;r_pid. ' p. 103. 
4 Alem, P. 180. 
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mi~itary paet on the side of Israe1.1 
The Soviet Entry in the ~.iddle East. -The Soviet Union could no 
longer remain a spectator in the face of this development: namely, the 
creation of the Baghdad Pact. In the Soviets' view this pact had the 
sole aim of undermining their security. Andrei Gromyko had expressed 
the :f'ear that, "the Soviet Union cannot remain indifferent in the :face 
of the situation existing at present with reb~d to the creation o:f' the 
above-mentioned b~ocs."2 The establishment "of the military bases on 
the territories o:f' the Near and l~ddle .East countries has an immediate 
bearing on the security of the Soviet Union."3 
In the tense atmosphere created by the Baghdad Pact. and vi th 
Palestine conflict still alive, the stand taken by the Soviet Union made 
a profound impression on the Arab leaders and nationalists. The outbreak 
of the Arab-Israeli crisis waa soon to give Moscow the opiortunity o:f' 
4 
affirming its long-standing dreams of being present in the Near East. 
The Nationalization of the Suez Canal Com;ea&.-The situation became 
dangerously aggravated by the suspension of negotiations between Egypt and 
the United States regarding the financing of the Aswan Dam. To find the 
necessary resources, Nasser nationalized the Suez Canal Company in July 
1956.5 The legal aspect of the nationalization of the Suez Canal falls 
1A.M. Goichon, "Lea Mtugi~s Palestiniens," Revue Esprit, No. 7 
( 1964 ) , p. 78. 
2 Jargy, P. 103. 
3Ibid. 
4Ibid., P. 104. 
5Roulea.u, 3e Combat, P. 115. 
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beyond the sco1)e of' this study. It is sufficient to note~ however, 
that by nationa.lizing the Suez Ce.na.l Company, Nasser created tremendous 
complications. 
On October 23, 1956, an Anglo-Franco-Israeli attack wa.s l.aunched 
against Egypt. The Kremlin authorities1 came to the rescue of Egypt, 
however. Shortly after that episode, the USSR was found again at the 
side of Syria in a similarly friendly role. As a consequence, the 
successors of Peter the Great and Catherine II found themselves in the 
Mediterranean region. 2 
Over a long period of time, Great Britain had used every possible 
means to prevent Russian access to the Bosphorus and the Dradanelles. 
To this end, she had given support to the Sultan and, later to the 
countries which had been emancipated from her suzerainty. Furthermore, 
in the Saa.dabad Pact she grouped together Turkey, Iraq, Iran and 
Afghanistan, following this move by the Bagllda.d Pact and the CENTO. 
This traditional antagonism between the Maritime and the Continental 
powers was always aimed at maintaining the barriers to Russian entry. 
However, by a tremendous political leap$ the Soviet Union rev~trsed the 
position established against her by her rivals. 3 
1Lfn fact a disinclination on the part of both· the US and the USSR 
to prevent the success of the Anglo-Franco-Israeli coalition seems to 
have been the active agent~/ 
2Dib, P. 14. 
3 Ibid., P. 15. 
CHAPTER VI 
TOWARDS A THIRD ROUND 
The Infernal Cycle.--By April 1, 1967, it had already become 
apparent that the Israeli-Syrian dispute was not confined to cultivation 
rights in the demilitarized zone. AIJ tensions grew between the Israeli 
and Syrian armed forces, General Odd Bull, Chief of Staff of the United 
Nations Truce Supervision Organization (UNTSO}, appealed on May 4 to the 
parties involved to observe the cease-fire and to resolve their differ-
ences through the Israeli-Syrian Mixed Armistice Commission (ISMAC).1 
Around May 10. President Nasser received four reports from 
different intelligence services - his own, the Soviets, the Syrian and 
the Lebanese - concerning the Israeli deployment of troops along the 
Syrian borders. The contents of the reports convinced Nasser that an 
Israeli attaek to overthrow the Syrian regime was imminent. 2 Further-
more, a declaration by the Israeli officials published by the British 
news on May 12, affirmed Israel's intention to overthrow the Damascus 
regime. General Ra.bbin admitted; ttwe have tried everything to prevent 
the activities of the Feda;yeens. ife are left vi th no other choice but 
to overthrow the Damascus regi~. " 3 However, the Israeli Government 
denied ~ such concentration of troops on the border. 
1Rouleau, 3e Comba~_, P. 74. 
2Ibid. 
3Ibid. 64 
65 
Whether Israel in fact contemplated an attack on May 17, as Nasser 
expected, or later, is difficult to know for sure. Nonetheless, Nasser 
was convinced that the crucial hour was approaching •1 Israeli officials 
had not denied their intention of attacking the Ba'athist regime of 
Syria. Furthermore, reprisal operations had become progressivelyla.rger 
since July-August, 1966. Military clashes had multiplied to culminate 
in the aerial raid of April 7, 1967, on Syria. These attacks did not, 
however, prevent the incursion of Syrian trained Fedayeens into Israel.2 
Regarding the question aa to what convinced Nasser of an Israeli 
attack~ it is as well to explore the factors which played a part in 
shaping the events of June, 1967. The ever-presence of the 1956 joint-
invasion of the Anglo-Franco-Israeli on Egypt had instilled the fear that 
Israel would try again, should the opportunity arise. 3 The apprehension 
provides the background to the event that followed during the Spring of 
1967. Both Egypt and Syria were convinced that Israel was ·preparing for 
another attack. Levi Eshkol' s warning that Israel would carry out 
military retaliation against Syria was considered serious by both Egypt 
and Syria, mainly because of the Israeli retaliation against the 
4 JordaniM. village of El Sammu in November, 1956. Furthermore, the 
absence of heavy milit~J equipment during Israel's Independence Day 
l Rouleau, P. 74. 
2Arthur Lall, The UN and the Middle East Crisis (New York: , 
Columbia University Press, 19681, P. 15 
3John s. Badeau, "The Arabs, 1967," The Atlantic, CCXX (December, 
:!.967), P. 102. 
4 Rouleau, P. 74. 
66 
parade added to their suspicions, that the troops might be deployed 
along the Syrian borders. This suspicion was confirmed by the Soviets 
in May, 1967, when they detected a concentration of military equipment 
along the borders o:f' Syria. 1 
In the light of these facts, Egypt's :fear that the United States 
and Great Britain might be induced to take measures similar to those 
taken in 1956 can be understood. Egypt's relations with both the United 
States and Great Britain had deteriorated steadily in the mid-sixties; 
American aid to Egypt had practically stopped and by 1967 President 
Nasser was convinced rightly or wrongly, that American Arab policy had 
taken on an unfavourable trend, undermining his position. 2 
By contrast, American support of Israel, together with the memory 
of' the 'carefully concealed Anglo-French involvement' in the 1956 
incident, seemed reasonable grounds tor confirmation ot the Arab sus-
picion that an Anglo-American connivance lay behind Israel's alarming 
pronouncements and reported military deployment along Syria's borders. 3 
Egypt's main preoccupation s~ema to have been her determinationnot 
to be caught by a surprise attack, as had happened in 1956. Nasser also 
hoped that the world community, through the United Nations, would not 
allow another outbreak of hostility between Israel and the Arab states.4 
Although the bitter experience of the Suez crisis provided the 
1Randolph S. Churchill and Winston S. Churchill, The Six J2& War 
(Boston: Houghton Mifflin Company, 1967), P. 28. 
2 Badeau, P. 69. 
3Ibid. 
4Ibid. 
\. 
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framework within which the Arabs took action during the months of May 
1967, there were other important considerations which bore directly on 
the Arab relations as a whole, and Egypto-Syrian in particular. 1 
After Syria's secession from the U.A.R., in 1961, both Syria and 
Egypt engaged in a prolonged cold war and rivalry, each contending to be 
the true heir of the Arab Revolution. Syria and its Ba'ath Party con-
sidered itself as the apostle of Arab socialism. On the other hand, 
Nasser claimed to be the symbol of Arab unity and Arab Revolution but 
was rejected by the Syrian Party. Syria had based her claim to such 
leadership on her firm stand with regard to Israe1. 2 
From Egypt's point of view, Syria's policies towards Israel could 
neither be overtly repudiated nor wholeheartedly pursued. Thus, the 
Syrian dilemma became more than a problem of Arabs vis-~-vis Israel; it 
became the enfant terrible of Arab unity. However, after five years of 
tension, Egypt took the initiative ;;.ad created an entente cordiale with 
Syria, which resulted in a defensive alliance in 1966. 3 
Viewed trom the perspective of' Israel's relations with her neigh-
bours, this alliance could rightly be interpreted aa a move against her. 
Ironically, it was in fact conceived as a device to curb Syria's 
relentless actions against Israel, which might involve Egypt in an un-
wanted conflict. The same line of reasoning was behind the creation of 
the United Military Command; Egypt was to take over the command of the 
~eau, P. 69. 
2Jbid. 
3Ibid. 
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Arab armed ~orces in order to prevent any unilateral action against 
Israel.1 
At the peak o~ the tension between Syria and Israel, in the Spring 
of' 1967, vben S,ria vas severely" attacked by Israel, it vas Syria vbo 
pressed Egypt to comply with her commitments. Thus, Egypt vas drawn 
into this conflict by the aggressive policies of' Syria towards Israel. 2 
Another reason f'or Egypt's action, independent of' the Suez-phobia, 
vas the precarious position of' Egypt vis-a.-vis the rest o~ the Arab 
World. 
With the secession of' Syria f'rom the U.A.R., in 1961, and Egyptian 
setbacks in Yemen, Egypt's position of' leadership was gravely under-
mined. The Egyptian sponsored uni~ied military command ~g&JJ tv f'ill 
apart. The divisions in the Ar&b League were so pronounced that Arab 
states could not agree on a summit meeting to discuss their problems. 
Thus, Egypt ~ound itself' isolated f'rom the reat of' the Arab world. 3 
As the largest Arab St&te, Egypt • s influence could not be ignored 
in Arab politics, a ~ctor which vent beyond the personality of Presi-
dent Nasser. Egypt, being the birth-place of the Arab Revolution and 
the crossroads of international relations, and having the largest armed 
forces, vas undoubtedly an important Arab state not to be by-passed in 
intra-Arab politics.4 
1 Rouleau, P. 69. 
2Ibid. 
3Ba.deau, P. 70. 
4Ibid., P. 78. 
In terms of the Arab-Israeli conflict in 1967, the ingredients of 
a crisis were present "in the situation and in the Arab suspicion of 
Israel's intent."1 However, as the crisis developed, Egypt may have 
2 
seen an opportunity to regain its natural leadership of the Arab world. 
It seems that President Nasser did not wish for war, possibly because a 
good portion of his troops were engaged in Yemen, he chose instead, a 
course mid~ between war a.nd no war - that of dissuasion. 3 He 
publicly dramatized the situation: he ordered the troops to march in 
unity through the streets of Cairo, in a manner reminiscent of the French 
troops parading through the Place de la Concorde, on their way to the 
German trontier! 4 Similarly the Egyptian troops reached the Israeli 
border. For the bluff to appear serious, Nasser felt obliged. to deJ11&nd 
the withdrawal of the United Nations troops which were stationed on the 
borders of the two countries. However, as a turther precaution, Nasser 
did not personally request U Thant to withdraw the troops. This step 
would have taken on an official and irreversible character. Instead, the 
request WR.s conveyed to General Rikh;ye, Commander of the UN forces, by 
his Egyptian counterpa.rt. 5 On May 16, General Rikhye received a letter 
from General Fs.vz;y, Chief of Staff of the Egyptian Armed Forces~ stating: 
~oules.u, P. 76. 
~au, P. 78. 
3Ibid. 
4 Rouleau, P. 76. 
5 
'Badeau, P. 78. 
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I have m:y instructions to all U .A.R. armed forces to be ready 
for action against Israel, the moment it might Ca.rl"'J out any 
aggressive action against any Arab country. Due to these 
instructions our1troops are already concentrated in Sinai on our Eastern borders. 
The UNEF WithdrawaL--On l-1a.y 18, th.: Egypt.:i'9.n Government formally 
requested the tJN Secretary-·Genera.l to vi thd.raw the UN Emergency Force 
troops from its territory. 2 The UNEF had been successfUl in creating a 
buffer zone along the Gaze. Strip and at Sharm-el-Sheilth, near the 
entrance to the Gulf of Aqaba, for eleven yea.rs. 3 
Following U Thant's agreement to the request for withdra.va.l, Egypt 
on Mey 23, declared the Gulf closed to Israeli shl,ping and any other 
ships carrying strategic goods to Israel. 4 The Secretary--General, upon 
his arrival in Cairo, warned President Nasser of the "dangerous conse-
quences" which might follov f:t"Q..?- his blockade of the Gulf of Aqaba. 5 
In a speech given on the occasion of the Egyptian Air Force Day, 
on May 23, President Nasser summed up his position: 6 
On May 12, a very J.lC.IJt.~. tinen·t :ata.tement was made that Israeli 
Comtna.nders have announced that they would carry out military 
operations against Syria. in order to occupy Damascus and overthrow 
the Syrian Government. On May 13, we reeei ved accurate inf'orma.tion 
that Israel was concentrating on the Syrian border huge armed forces 
of about 11 to 13 brigades. The decision made by Israel at this 
time was to carry out an aggression against Syria on May 17. On 
lunited Nations, Document (A/6669, May 18, 1967), P. 4. 
2Ibid. 
3tal1, P. 15. 
4
united Nations, Document (A/6672), P. 20. 
5Ibid. 
6The New York Times, May 23, 1967, P. 2. 
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May 14, we took our measures. The forces began to move in the 
direction of Sinai to take up position • • • On May 16, we requested 
the withdrawal. of the IDi Emergency Force ••• If' there is a true 
deBire tor peace 9 we say that we also work for pea.ce. But does 
peace mean that we should ignore1the rights of the Palestinian people because of' lapse of' time? 
The late Israeli Prime Minister, speaking at a press conference at 
Tel-Aviv on May 5, blamed the Arab states for starting the war, de-
claring that Israel had informed the Security Council that she vas only 
invoking Article 51 of' the tl'N Charter, which permits the right of' member 
states to act in self-defense, and that Israel was fighting to "trus-
trate the attempt of' Arab armies to capture our land, to break their 
vall or encirclement and the seige of' aggression that has been estab-
lished around us."2 
Similarly, Moshe Drqa.u, Is~l 's then newly appointed Defense 
Minister, declared in a radio message on June 25: "we have no aim at 
territorial conquest. Our sole objective is to bring to nought the 
attempt of' the Arab armies to eonquer our country 9 and to destroy the 
encircling blockade and aggression."3 Both the United States and the 
United Kingdom declared their intention of' pursuing a neutral course in 
the conflict; the United States, however, was soon to modify its stand 
in the conflict. France reinforced her neutrality, on June 5, by 
announcing a suspension of' shipnents of' military equipm.ent to the Middle 
4 East. 
·~he New York Times, May 23, 1967, P. 2. 
2.rbe New York Times, May 5, 1967, P. 2. 
3Ibid. 
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Moreover, the failure of' the Advisory Committee to request an 
immediate session of the Gener'1l Assembly with regard to the situation, 
was an admission of the inef:fecti veness of such forces in the light of 
the terms of ita mandate contained in Resolution 1001 (ES-1).1 
After meeting vith the Advisory Committee of UNEF on M~ 18, 
U Tha.nt stated that he had no alternative but to comply with the U.A.R. •s 
request. Some rep:reaentati ves tel t, however, that the Secretary-General. 
should have clarified previously~ with the Government of the U.A.R., the 
precise meaning of' its requeat that the wi thdraval of the UNEJ' should 
take place "as aoon aa possible. "2 
On May 16, the :Sri tish ll'oreiSQ. Secretary, George Brown~ apea.king at 
a dinner for the Ul Association in London, assailed U Thant' s decision to 
vithdrav the UIEll', sqing "it really makes a mockery of the peace-
keeping force of the United. Nationa if', as soon as tension rises, the UN 
force is told to lea:ve ••• indeed, the collapse of UNEF might well have 
repercussions on other UN peace-keeping forces, and the credibility of' 
the United Nationa's etf'orts in this tield are thrown into question.•3 
Similarly, Levi Eshkol, in hi a address to the K.nesset, on May 22, 
criticised U Thant'a precipitous action on the basis that the former 
Secretary-General~ the late Dag Hammarskjold, had assured Israel that on 
1Hal. Kosut (eel. ) , Israel and the Arabaa the June 196 War (New 
York: Facta on File Publicatioo, 19 8 , P. TO. 
2Uni ted Nations, General Assembly, A reJ20rt prepared by the 
Seeretarz::G!neral on the Withdrawal of' the UNEF, (A/6730, June 3, 1967), 
P. 8. 
~. Sunday Times {London) , May 25, 1967, P. 2. 
a deci~ion to withdraw the UNEF it would be "the Secretary-General's 
obligation to inform the Advisoey Committee on the UNEF, which would 
determine whether the matter should be brought to the attention of the 
Assembly. "1 
The text of the request did not make it explicit that a total with-
drawal of the UN forces was demanded; nor was 8:llY :mention :made of the 
"blue caps being repl.aced by the lg.vptia.n forces at Charm-el-Sheikh. " 2 
At this stage# the whole affair was stUl a purely local matter. 
General Rikhy'e replied, "I am not authorized to take such a measure' ... 
President lfuaer alone has the right to make such a request from 
U Tha.nt. " 3 At this point# Nuser had no other choice than to put for-
ward to U Thant the demand for ri thdrawal. It should be noted that the 
demand tor withdrawal of the UIEJ' troll Charm-el-Bheikh was not mentioned. 
All evidence points to the fact that Preaident Iasser did not intend, at 
4 this stage at least, to close the straits of Tiran to Israeli navigation. 
U Thant' a reaction, to sq the least, was surprising. Since the 
UltE:F could not be ahitted around without undermining its effectiveness, 
U Thant ordered the total withdrawal ot the t.JNEP from Egypt. Conse-
quently, the withdraval of the Uif.ll;lJ' drama.tiaed the alread,y tense situa-
tion in the area and changed the Israeli attitude in favor of war. Until 
~e Jerusa.lem Post Weekly, December 2, 1968, PP. 10-11. 
2 Rouleau, P. 11· 
3Lal.l, p. 21. 
4!Ell· 
then, Israel was convinced that, being involved in Yemen, Egypt would 
not risk a military confrontation with her.1 
Pi3" his action, U Thant J?Ut Kaeser in an extremely embarrassing 
situation; President Nasser had no choice but to request the total 
withdrawal of the UNEF. 2 
Once again, the Secretary-General behaved in a curious WB.Y\c 
instead of couulting the :Big Powers or convening the S.curity Council, 
he co:aplied with Nasser's request without hesitation. Nasser was 
em.povered by the UNEF to ask for its withdrawal but he va.s under the 
impression that U Thant, and the United Nations as a whole, would resist 
his demand, thus allowing him to set forth his strategy and launch the 
diplomatic crisis as he wished. However, the Seoretary-Qeneral. 's rash 
decision came as a great surprise to the Es:Y"Ptia.n officials , including 
Buser. 
Two contradictor.y bypotheses ~ere presented to explain U Thant's 
behaviour; some believed that he wished to put the Americans in a diffi-
cult position in the Middle East, in order to force a progressive 
diae~t in Viet lla.m.; 3 the other group held the view, however~ that 
he had been encouraged. by the Americans, who wished to call Nasser's 
bluff and to strike a blow at his prestige. The upholders of the latter 
hypothesis believed that the Americans had wanted ~Jasser' s head~ so to 
luri Avnery, Israel Without Zionistss a Plea for Peace in the 
Middle Eut (New York: The MacMillan Company, 19~8), P. 25. 
2Rouleau, P. 78. 
3Ibid. 
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speak .. f'or some time .now and knew that the time was ripe to humiliate 
him and possibly, bring about his downf'all.1 
On the other side of' this complex political network were Nasser's 
opponents who, from the outset, looked suspiciously upon the UNEF as th.e 
foreign force stationed on Egyptian soil, for the sole purpose of' 
assuring the right of navigation to Israeli shipping in the Strait of' 
Tira.n. Thq would not have hesitated to discredit Nasser, in tront of 
the Arab masses, for such duplicity. 2 Nevertheless, Wasser resisted auch 
pressures and allegations. He. also .knew that the closure of the Strait 
of Tiran would be considered a 9.!!..\Mt belli by Israel. He ha.d expressed 
some apprehension to the Syrian artd Iraqi officials who were at a con-
ference in Cairo, in April 1963. They had suggested to :Nasser that "it 
we.s time to demand the withdrawal of the UBEF. n3 It was humiliating 
that the Arabs, after the Suez expedition of 1956, still encouraged 
Israel's comm.ercial relations with Atrlca and the rest of Asia. "You 
must prevent Israel's ships passing through the Strait of Tiran. "4 To 
these requests, Iasser had replied that such an action on their part 
would mean an invitation to open hostilities, precisely at a time when 
Arab countries were not in a poai ticm to vin the war. 5 During l96T, 
~uleau, P. 78. 
2Ibid. 
3 Ibid., P. eo. 
4 Ibid.' p. 81. 
5vincent Monteil, "Le Probl~me du Moyen-orient," No. D 4554, 
(Gen~ve, 1968), P. 8. 
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Nasser's decision remained un~ange4,. 
It is quite possible that, U 'l:hant 's attitude may have contributed 
a great deal to the outbreak of var. in 1967.1 Also, while the menace to 
Syria seemed very real~ it may be assumed that Nasser indeed made a 
great error of judgement in attempting to intimidate his opponent. He 
paid dearly for this mistake. 
On May 15, 1967, Radio .Cairo ofticia.lly announced the deployment ot 
the Egyptian troopa into Sinai. On May .16, . Israel ordered the mobil!-
zation other reaerves. 2 Until May 19, Israel's attitude towards the 
Egyptian move, if anything at all, ws.s hardly alarming. But news ot 
Egypt' a transfer of troops trom the Ye%11ftn into Sinai brought events onto 
an ominous path. This was indeed the turning point, when the Hebrew 
Government regarded the situation u "very serious. " 3 
The Edito:r-in-Clliet of the &-Ahra:ln, Moh-.mmad Hassanein Heikal, had 
given an explanation of the EQPtian deployment to the etf'ect that it 
assumed an "offensive position,•4 p~marily to draw Israel's attention 
a'Va7 trom the Syrian border over . to the Egyptian border. "Once the aim 
of such a distraction has been achieved, the troops are to return to a 
"defensive position,"5 
1 Rouleau, P. 80. 
~onteil, P. 10. 
~eodore Draper, Israel and the World Politics: Roots of the 
Third Arab-Israeli War (lew York: The Viking Press, 19E;7), P. 75. 
4The Al-Ahram (Cairo) , October 6, 1961, P. 1. 
5Ibid. 
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Thereupon, Nasser's statement ,that his troops would come to the 
aid of Syria tolled in Israel. As one Israeli expressed it: " .•• by 
posing the threat to our frontiers. he {President Nasse!:T rang the bell 
hidden in the unconscious mind of very Israeli; a signal which turns 
Israel, within minutes, from a pe~eful countr:r into en armed camp. ttl 
The Blockade of the_ Gulf of ~·-The third portentou move 
occurred with the Egyptian army taking up their ]OSition in the Strait of 
Tiran, filling the vaeuum created by the withdrawal of the UN forces. 
This action, whether Ifaaser ve.nted or not, 111eant blockade of the Israeli 
ships, and an Israeli retaliator.r measure to open up the Strait by 
force. 2 The credibility of the Israeli a.rm;y vas at stake at this point 1 
Israel could not a:ftord to retreat. 3 
As was feared, Nasser e.:nnounee,d the Strait of Tiran closed to 
Israeli shipping on M«1 22, stating that mines had been laid in the 
Strait. Arter the var, b.oveve:t', it was disclosed that none had been 
laid. The explanation given :for IUCh a false statement, or the 'white 
lie • , was that Egypt hoped that such a move might prevent Israeli ships 
from entering the Strait, thereby relieving Egyptian forces trom the need 
to fire. 4 !n ather words, President Nasser's last hope of averting the 
w.r unfortunately produced the adverse e.:ftect and accelerated the crisis. 5 
1 Avnery, P. 75. 
2Churchill & Churchill~ P. 30~ 
3 Avnery, P. 75. 
4 Rouleau, P. 79. 
5 Avnery, P. 26. 
To what extent the Port of EJ.ath~ whose closure was considered a 
casus belli, constituted the vital route for Israeli shipping it is 
difflcul t to judge. However, a<; cording to the words of Eric Rouleau, the 
blockade of the Port of Elath was not for the Israelis, 'so to speak, a 
question or life and death. Elath handled only 5 per cent of the total. 
commerce, while less than 3 per oent was affected by the closure of the 
Gulf of Aqaba. This was because only a fraction of Israeli shipping 
passed through this merchant traffic. 1 What was really affected, in fact, 
was the delivery of petroleum. Here a.gain, until 1956 petrole'Wll was 
being shipped through Haifa, which h why the Egyptian Govel"tUU.l.&nt did not 
consider it altogether serious when the Israeli Government ta.lked of the 
closure as the casus belli. 2 
On Mq 22, U Tha.nt sent a telegram to President Nasser, requesting 
an interview. Nasser accepted immediately, hoping that an honorable sol-
ution might be found. The two men met in a secret session in Cairo, to 
find e. wa::r out of the impasse; they reached the following agreement: 
1) that the parties involved should abstain from actions which 
might asgravate the already tense situation; 
2) that a special representative should be nominated to mediate 
between Cairo-Tel-Aviv concerning a solution to the Tiran 
conf'lict; 
3) that the Secretary-General. should make a.n appeal to all the 
ma.ri time powers to postpone deli very of strategic materials 
to the Port of' Elath ud- reroute them, instead, to the Port 
of' Haifa, as vas done before 1956.3 
1Rouleau:. P. 81. 
2Ibid. 
3Ibid., P. 83. 
A week later, President Jo~on of the United States, sent his 
special envoy, Mr. Charles Yost, to Cairo. He was not given 'an audience 
by P,.esident Nasser himself; the Minister for Foreign Affairs, Mahmoud 
Riad, met him and an agreement on the three following points was con-
cludedt 
a) The problem must be solved through diplomatic channels 
and in a pacific manner. 
b) Egypt would have no objection to the Ti~ case being 
present<!id to the International Court of Justice, in the 
Hague. 
c) ~u· -".:':t:t. t-1oheiuddin, the First Vice-President of the 
Republic, should go to Washington for nertiations :for 
a compromise acceptable to both parties. 
A:tter giving assurances that Israel would not attack as long. aa the 
diplomatic channels remained open, Charles Yost lett Cairo on Saturday', 
June 3, precisely two days prior to the outbreak of hostilities. 2 
Meanwhile, war propaganda was used in an attempt to avert the im-
pending confrontation, by impressing the Israeli Government or the superi-
ority of the Arab army and enabling Nasser to win a bloodless victory. 
It bad, indeed the opposite affect in Israel. Likewise, as a possible 
means of avoiding imminent war, Nasser signed a military pact with Jordan. 
This hasty military alliance was the decisive ra~cor in Israel's decision 
to go to war. 3 
In the wake of the Egypto-Jo~ian defense pact, the Israeli 
Government, until then torn between the hawks and the doves, decided to 
~ouleau, P. 83. 
2walter Laqueur, The Road to Jerusalem: the Orj_g!n_s of the Arab-
Israeli Connict 1967 (New York.: The M8.C!L'1illa.n Company, 1968), P. 1 T4. 
3Ibid. 
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go to war. Moshe Dayan, the most anti-Arab Israeli, was appointed to the 
post or Derense Minister. Mili ta.ry plans were made in no time, and 
Israel was ready to strike.1 
President Nasser's May 28 Pr!BB Conrerence.--In his Press Conrer-
ence, President Nasser suggested that a reactivation or the mixed Egypto-
Israeli Armistice Commission was becoming necessaroy. This move could 
result in the withdrawal or both the Egyptian and Israeli troops "rrom the 
two sides or the frontier. He also requested a global conference on the 
Palestinian issue and negotiation on the pending problem by the mediating 
powers. 2 He also pointed out that the Tiran Con-rlict had but a secondary 
position in the Arab-Israeli conflict: that "the issue which is precipi-
tating the war is neither the Gulr of Aqaba nor the Strait or Tiran nor 
the withdrawal of the UNEF but the rights of the Palestinian people."3 
In the final analysis, the Aqaba crisis had three phases: 
1} President Nasser',s bluff to divert an attack against 
Syria; 
2) the escalation which brought them to the edge of war; 
3) President Nasser'.s mad hope or trying to evade war by 
drawing a major political victory: that ot keeping the 
sovereignty over the Strait of Tiran, in exchange for 
certain concessions to Israel. This was, in fact, t~e 
purpose of Zak.aria Moheiuddin' s visit to Washington. 
Likewise, Nasser had dreamed of a global negotiation. Cairo of-
ricials believed that Nasser was ready to :make concessions in view or the 
1 Avnery, P. 30. 
2 Rouleau, P. 83. 
3.rbe New York Times, June 10, 1967, P. 2. 
4 Rouleau, P. 91. 
globa.l discussions, from which he h&d hoped to emerge, once again, 
strong in the eyes of the Arab world. 1 The 1956 crisis, in facts had 
bestowed upon Nasser the stature of a national hero and an undisputed 
leader of the Arab world. This, too, vas what he vas hoping to regain 
from this arisia. 2 
l Rouleau, P. 91. 
2 Badeau, P. 87. 
CHAPTER VLI 
THE THIRD ARAB-ISRAELI WAR 
~he Six.,-D!l Wa.r.-On June 5, 1967, Israel practically destroyed 
Egypt's aviation, on the ground. In six days her trpops occupied Sinai, 
the Gaza Strip, vest of the Jordan river, the Syrian zone of Qanetra and 
the Old City of Jerusalem. Why? The pretext vas the closure of the 
Strait of Tiran by Egypt and the withdrawal of the United Nations Emerg-
ency Forces trom the Ge.za Strip. But Egypt had not signed, in March 1957, 
the agreement on the Rights of Navigation in the Strait of Tiran. for 
less than one mile on each side.1 
Moreover, this could not have been the ~- belli, 'because, as 
mentioned earlier, only 5 per cent of the Israeli exporting commercial 
ships and only 2 per cent of the Israeli ne:vy passed Elath. 
To stop the fighting, the UN Security Council met almost continu-
ously- from June 5 through the 12, in an effort to achieve a cease-fire 
in the area. Arter the adoption of a cease-fire resolution, in an ad-
dress to the Council, Abba Eban stated that his country welcomed the 
resolution, but its implementation "depended on acceptance and coop-
eration of the other parties," who were responsible for the situation; 
that a new Middle Eastern settlement should be constructed after the 
cease-tire e.nd must depend upon certain princ.iples 1 
·------------~---------------------------------
1Jean-Francis Held$ Israel et les Arabes 11_le 3e Combat (Paris: 
Edition de Beuil, 1967), P. 91. 
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the first of' these {PrincipleiJ must surely be the acceptance 
of' Israel's statehood and the total elimination of the fiction of 
non-existence ••• the second, must be that of' a peaceful settlement 
of disputes ••• through direct contact.l 
It would be well to note that the 'Palestine Conflict', as the 
issue in the Arab-Israeli conflict over the past 20 years, was totally 
omitted by the Israeli Government in the new would-be peace settlement. 
This indicates that, after those years of fighting, the parties to the 
dispute had not yet agreed on the real cause of the trouble. 
Likewise, Abba Eban questioned the usefulness of the United 
Nations Emergency Force, asking "it it is in effect an umbrella which 
2 is taken away as soon as it begins to rain." 
In short, the Security Council finally managed to achieve a cease-
:tire and reactivated the United Nations Truce Supervision Office (UNTSO). 
The latter was made more effect! ve by the fact that all parties to the 
dispute consented. 3 
On the other hand, as a result of a letter f'rom the Soviet Foreign 
Minister, Andrei Gromyko to the Secretary-General, the Fifth Emergency 
Special Session vas convened. Mr. Grom:yko's letter, dated June 13, 
1.967, referred to Article ll of the Charter of' the United Nations, vhicll 
authorizes the General Assembly to consider any question having a bear-
4 ing upon international peace and security. 
1 Laqueur, P. 124. 
~osut, P. 99. 
3uni ted Nations, Security Council, Especial Session on the Midcp.e 
East Crisis (Resolution 235, June 7, l967J, P. 11. 
4 Lall, P. 118. 
In the ensuing debates of the, Fifth Emergency Session, the Arab pos-
ition was defended by the Prime Minister of the Sudan, Mr. M.A. Mahgoub. 
On the question of the legalities of the blockade of the Strait ofTiran, 
in support of Egypt, he stated that 1 
Israel claimed a bellige~nt's right of retaliation on Syria 
in April 1967. The United Nations found that Israel vas not justi-
fied in this and censored Israel. But, even it it wen junitie4, 
Egypt could certainly exercise a comparable and leas blood7 bel-
ligerent risht, namely', to close the Strait ot Tiraa to strategic 
cargo tor Iarael.l 
Furthermore, Mr. Mahgoub assorted that Elath had been occupied 
almost a month attar the parties had signed the Armistice Agreement of 
February 1949. Be added that, granting the cause of provocation was 
Egyptian propaganda and by the Arab &1'111' vi thin its frontiers, "the ac-
tion taken by Israel was not leai timate self-defense, vi thin the meaning 
of Article 51 of the United :Natiou Charter, bee&USe no armed attack on 
her terri tory had in tact taken place. "2 
Speaking on behalf ot Israel,. 011 the other hand, Abba Eban pro-
posed that, "in tree negotiations vi th each of our neighbor•, we ahall 
offer durable and Just aolutions rebounding to our mutual advantage and 
honor. "3 His statement, despi t. its cordial spirit, le:rt undefined the 
more basic and urgent questiou, such aa the tate of the conquered ter-
ri tories. From the perapecti ve of the United Nations Charter - Israel 
being one of its Member States. utters such aa vi thdraval from the oc-
eupied territories tall within the scope of the United Nations Charter -
~1, P. 131. 
2xbid. ' p. 139. 
3Ibid.. p. 140 
this problem ia not one which could be l.rt to negotiations, unless 
thoae negotiations were carried . out within the tramework or the United 
N'ationa.1 
At lea.at, the Fi.tth bergoacx. Seaaion of tho General Aaeembly 
achieved, in principle, the agreement of all the parties involved on 
the :f'olloving three points: l) . (;Onquest of terri toey by toree was in-
a4miaaible& 2) peace in the Middle East bad long been overdue; and, 
3) treedoll of atatea involved, tram the threat of honilitiea. 2 
U 'a!!;t' • R,tfpe of the UNE! W& tl¥\l!'!!l· --Tbe Secretar:y-Genere.l 
of the United latiou, U Tb.ant, aulai tted a report on Jue 21 to the 
General .Aaaeabl.T, ia defense of .hie Mq 16 decision to comply with 
lgpt' • reqv.eat tor the vi thdra'WIIl of 'he Ulf forces h'om the troubled 
area abortly 'before the outbreak of hoatili ties. The report stated 
that, " • • • ari tioiam of this -.tun would be duasinc to the United 
lf.atiou in gennl, and ita pet.c4t:"lteepiq role in :pa.l'ticular. 3 Re 
tried to absolve hi.uelt trom the chargee againat hie precipitous ao-
tion whioh aauaed the war in the Middle East. Re vu &lao ch&raed with 
deliberatel.7 ipol'iBC the coatonta of a personal Aide~ire of the 
late Ul S.Cretar;r-Oeneral, Dag Raauankjold, to the effect that on 
Augut 5, 1957, he had pernacled the Ee;T,t>tia.n Qoveruunt to limit ita 
4 
"sovereign riP,t in the interest of ••• the UlfEI' operation. • u Thant 
lt&ll, P. 140. 
2Ibi4. • p. 188. 
-
3u.i ted lfatiou, Genel'&l. A.aaembl)r, l)ocument, A Repqrt f"~d bz 
the Secret!:17':Qener&l U Thant on the With4raval of the UDPA/T307A4-
di tional, June 3, 1967), P. 8. . · 
b.Di!· 
declared that the outbreak of hoatil.i ties vas not precipitated by the 
UJ'EF vithdraval., but by the "continuing Arab-Israeli eontl.ict .. "1 UNEF'a 
effectiveness u a buffer aone vaa lost as soon as "direct conflton-
tation between Israel and the United Arab Republic vas revived atter a 
decade, by the decision of the latter to move its forces up to the 
Armistice l.ine •••• • 2 This occurred before the formal U.A.R. request 
for the vi thdraval. of the UN force. 
Se also stated that EQ'Pt ha4 the right to terminate t.JNEJ' oper-
ations at «QJ time and that this riaat had.uever been questioned. 
Since Israel had retwled to alloY UIEJ' troops on ita soil, the eff'ec-
ti veneas of the UDJ' as a butter force vu vboll;y dependent "u:pon the 
voluntary action of the U .A. R. in keeping ita troopa &we:'/ from. the 
line.•3 
~. right of Bs;y'pt to JIOVe U).l ita troops to the Armistice line, 
,. 
therefore, eo\11.4 not be questioned. Once such a move had t&lten place, 
aa it did on May 17, "UflU eoul4 no longer perform aey uaetul :tunctiou 
in ll&intainin& quiet. and its oontinuin& preanoe on Egyptian terri tory 
lost ita real. aigaitioanee. "' 
Likewise, on the question of .the .blockade, EQ"P't hel4 that, being 
at war vi th Israel u.d the entrance to the Gulf of Aqab& falling vi thin 
P. 8. 
luni te4 'lations, General Aaaf!flllbly, Document, (A/ 6730 I Ad4i tione.l), 
2 Ibid., P. 18. 
-
3Ibi.d. 
4 ill!•, P. 12. 
5Ibid. 
her territorial wters, she had the right to close it to Israeli ship-
l pin~· Egpt also claimed that Israel's risht of punge had been 
impos94 att~ the joint-attack on the Suez Canal in 1956.2 Further-
more, the recapturing of the Gulf of Aqaba vu in 1'aet, at leut in the 
eyes of the Arabs, a reusertion ot EQpt • s BO'Yereign rights away troa 
the grip of imperialism.. 3 
The JNJ.XiiiUJa width of the Gulf' is oYer three miles and, u such, 
it vu couidered from a legal point of Yiew to be the 'high seas' • 
But, IQPt and ot.hv Arab states .do D.Qt recognise the three-mile limit' 
,. 
rather, theT iuis't on a 12-aile limit. Legal experts pointed out that 
merchant wssel.s ud perhapa warabipa, too, have the right of puaage 
through territorial wa.tersa an4, " ••• a coastal state could regulate 
. ~ 
the paaaage of ships, but could DOt pNYent th• altogether." Had the 
12-ld.l.e limit 'been accepted by Esnt, the Strait of !'j.ra.n 'WOUld then 
have constituted Jc1pt 's territorial waters. 5 llowe'Y'er 1 Israel still 
had the ript ot pusage a.eoordina to XnternatioDal. Lav, vb.ioh spells 
out that a sea cu 'be closed, it all the states· surrounding it agree. 
Israel, one of the littoral. states, would !30t ear•• to the closing of 
the Strait ot tirana it appears, tl:&ea, that the blockade of Israeli 
ahippiac vu illegal. Jut, Egpt .4oea not reoop.ise Israel.. 'l'herefore, 
~ev, P. T4. 
~eau, P. 102. 
3r.queur, P. T4. 
41'be 8u!l!l;1,1•• (London)~ ";Rights of Sea Puaap," (J\llle 4, 
l96T), P. 2. 
5nta. 
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and in the last analysis, the question of the blockade is a "political 
question rather than a legal one."1 
There are tour points regarding the United Nations Emergency 
Forces (U.NEF), and ita significant role in the 1967 War, which merit 
attention: 
1) UliEF vaa conceived only u a ta.po%'1.17 measure, vith no 
specific duration. 2 
2) Ita aooeptuce by Egy:pt, _,a neoeaa1U7 factor in ita creation, 
followed by u EQ'P'iian deolan.tion that it 'WOUld "be suided in good 
faith, in ita acceptance of the General Assembly Reaoluuon 1000 (ES-I) 
of November 5, 1956."3 
'rhia atat•ent meant that EQPt was bound to observe the pro-
viai01l8 of the Egypto-Israel.i Armistice Agreement of 1949, including 
restraint from raids and the intro4u.ction ot m1i t&r)" equipment into 
the area. Thus • arq action by E&YPt or Israel, by virtue ot Article VII 
of the Armistice Agreement, vas limited in the Sinai area to "defense 
f'orcea only. .. 4 
3) The Ul'dted Nations, along with UDJ', should have developed 
measures for the stabilization of' a peacetul situation in the Mid4l.e 
East. Thia section ot Resolution 1125 (XI) vas stressed by' the 
~. SuaQ.y Times, P. 2. 
2uni ted Nations , General Assembly, (A/ 3276, :November I+, 1956) , 
P. 3. 
3 BuJ'na, P. 140. 
4
umted lations, Oenere.l Aaaab1y, (A/6669, Mfq 18, 1967), P. 4. 
Secretary"-General, U Thant, in his report of Ma;y 18, 1967.1 
4) The General Assembly made no delegation ot power regarding 
the termination of UIEF tunotiou. Ia thia case, the riibt of iQ'.Pt, 
as the atate Which had accepted UNU' on her soil, made the isaue more 
2 
complicated. Iarael, u a. party to the dispute, had retuaed to coop-
erate with the General Assembly and the UliU remained 'stillborn' on 
her borderi. 3 
Bgypt • on the other hand, ha4 eonaented to the deplO)'Dlent of the 
UJlEF troops on her terri tor.r, thu creating a' duality b;y virtue of 
wtdch UDJ' 'Could be disbanded either by the General Assembly or bf 
Egpt. 4 
lr.J.1, P. 12. 
2 Ibid., P. 15. 
3lbid.' p. 16. 
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CHAPTER VIII 
At the outbreak of hostilities it vas believed that Egypt had 
attacked first. Later events proved that the deeision to strike first 
wea taken by the Iaraeli Government. 1 Levi Eahkol admitted this in a 
d.eQlara.tion on July 8, 1967, followed by a similar statement by Moshe 
Dayan. J'urthel"JJ10re, Mr. Per~s, the Israeli representative at the United 
:Nationa, stated that he intended to gi Te a broader interpretation to 
the notioa ot legitimate defeue. 2 'l'o him, blockade of the Gulf' of' 
Aqaba characterised an ag~saion, Which juatit'ied Israel in defending 
henelf by military a.ction. Such reasoning could prove very 4angerous 
in circumstances in which the slightest ditrerence of opinion among the 
belligerents could constitute a legitimate right to open hostilities. 3 
Nonetheless, as mentioned elQ,ewhere, Egypt did not sign, in March 
19'1, the .Agreement on the Right ot :Na:rlgation in her territorial vatera 
or lese than a mile at her sides... J'urthermore t Jea.n-rra.:ncis Held. 
Preas Correaponclant tor Nouvelle . Obaerrateur, in Israel and an expressed 
Zionist sympathiaer., was or the opinion that closure of the Strait of 
l Rouleau, P. 109. 
~nteil, P. 3. 
3Ibid. 
4Ibid. 
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Tira.n could not have constituted a legitimate casus belli, since only 
5 per cent of Israeli commerce had been passing through Elath. of which 
"olllJ' 2 per cat vu Israeli navigation. What had in f'act. been aftee-
ted wu the f'1ov of petroleum, Yhioh., until 1956, vas coming through 
R&ifa."1 However, it was later learned that Egpt wu even prepared to 
authorise the puaace of petrolea detrtined tor the Port of llllaim. 2 
oa the other hand, Syria vu menaoed; and on M.,- 12 the Israeli 
autboritiea 4eoluted their int•ntion ot overthrowing the l>amuCUB 
regime, to put a eD.d to the incuniou of the Commandos. 3 
Apia, Metorctinc to Jeu-hencis Held, "all. the Iareeli militar.r 
pot•ti&l.s wee· aaaembled in auoh a formation that. tecbnicall.y' speak-
ing, it coulcl aot haft been t.rJttbing but an of1"enai v.. "4 lov'eYer, it 
seeJI8 tkt, a kind ot paychologieltl varfare dis ted for some tiM be-
tweea them, nea prior to the outbreak ot aetual hoat.ili ties, u will 
be exp,lonct llhOI'U.J'. 
'l'h! P!z!l!1od.cal V&l"1'ate•--l:t ia true that Arab propagaada p.l.a;red 
ea UJ....1'ated rol.e in the evoluion ot tlle oriais leading to the 'adrd 
~ 
.AJ'&b-Xsnel.i War ot 1967. However, iDtem.atioaal political tactora 
plqeA aa eq11f&l.l.T importaat part. vtlioh should not be underestimated. 5 
It is aoaewtaat aa4 that 'l'el-4Yiv, hall alwap pftfen-ed to retain 
~teU, P. 3. 
~eau, P. 83. 
~teil, P. 3. 
~Held, Le 3e Combat" P. lOT. · 
5Rovl.eau~ P. ~6. 
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the bellicose verbalism ot Arab propaganda but to make an abstraction 
ot the o:rten reasonable behaviour of the Arab authorities. 1 There is 
some truth in the tact that Nasser had increaaed his attempts, ever 
since 1951, to a"VOid war vi th Israel. In particular, he prevented the 
P'e~eens f'rom operating beyoncl Esn>tian terri torr. For ll years he 
maintained the "Blue Caps" on its trontien, to ensure naviga:Uon rigbta 
tor Israeli ships in the Gulf or Aqaba despite, aoae bitter clis&~Ne­
menta betvettn the Arab leaders. 2 lven on Mq 28, in an interview with 
the Preas, President Iasser had &fi'iaed that it was possible to open 
up a way tor settlement, if Israel vciuld agree to abide by the UN res-
olut!on.3 
It ahoulcl be borne in mincl tl:\at the Arabs consider Israel an 
alien a'\ate, created b7 torce in their land as an extension ot toreie;a 
doJdnation\ 4 and it still reaiu the a)'!llbOl ot imperialism against 
their national stN&gl.es. The Partitioa Plan or the United Ifations, 
the Arabs claim, vu carried out apiut the wishes ot the majority ot 
the people of Palestine, who coutituted 2/3 of the total population or 
the 'Whole area at the time, aad Israel was given t..o per cent ot the 
total cUltivable land in Palestine. 0a the basis of 23 per cent Jewish 
,owne:esblp. Mo:recrnr, the votes tor the Partition Plan (UI General. 
.Asa.Uly, November 29, 1947) vu ""iwct b7 virtue ot the Western bloc. 
laou1eau, P. 14.6. 
2Ibid. 
3Ib!d. 
4 Badeau, P. 103. 
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as well as by diplomatic pressures on the "client states. "1 
The Arabs turther claim tbat, wader the United Natiou Charter, 
the UN did not have author! ty to diepoae ot their land. Another factor, 
thtV point out • vae Israel's unilatenl. policies tJ'om the 4awn or its 
existence, in defiu.ce or the international communi tyt 
1) On the eTe of the creatic:tn or tarael, in 1948, by unprovoked 
attaek.s on Arab territories, the .. liOJd.at state occupied areas not in-
clu4e4 in the Pani tion Plan; 2 
2) Is:rael retwsed to part.iol}'ate in the Ul Mixed Arlaiat!oe Com-
missiOD meetiass. ru-thel"'llre, atter tl\e 1956 oriais, Israel again 
retuaed Ul • s requeat to allow Ul lmerlft07 J'oroes on her borders l 3 
3) Israel repeatecll.y diare~ the demilitarized boun4ariu' 
-cn.aent aa4 oftea extended lu.d I'Mlam&tioa beyond those areas. Tbia 
vaa the oauae ot border oluhH with SJria in 1966-1961, Vhioh led, 
later in the s- year, to opea hoatilities;4 
4) 'l'he refUgee probl• • • • .rter 'the creatioa or Israel, the 
retugee question wu taken up by tl\e Ulf Oener.:L Aaaembly on December ll, 
1948, when it wu stated that, "retupes wishing to nturn to their 
hosaea U1d live at }ie&ee with their aeipbora sho\114 be permitted to do 
ao at the earliest praoUe&l date, aa4 oom.pensation should be paid tor 
the property of those choosing not to return and tor loss and damage to 
l.a.ct.au, P. 104. 
2xbtd. 
3nid. 
4 Laooll'tOUft, P. TT. 
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property • nl 
Israel, the Arabs claim, has . tailed to show any concern over the 
refugee problem., nor haa she tried to implement the UN Resolution. In-
deed, lack ot suoh willingness by the Isruli Govermaent is. interpreted 
by the Arabs aa · a sign ot anti-Arabism. 2 , 
The Arabs point also to a s.tiJ;t.-nt . ma4e in l95T by General Yigal. 
Allon, then Commander in the North, who said& "while planning the cap-
ture ot the Arab part ot Sated, it was not our intention to prevent the 
tli&ht of the Arab population. "3 It vas also the aim ot Ben-Gurion and 
his Goverr.uaent, to evict the Arab population during the 1948 war, and 
4 
that by psycholo&ical intimidation, this aim vu aohieTed. Contrar,y 
to Zioaiat propap.n4a, which claimed that .the Arab Govermnents ,issued 
proclamationa calling upon Arabs to .leave their holllH, lrakine Childen, 
and a few other writers, stated that they .had. examined all the moaitored 
broadcasts from. the Arab stations in 1948 and twt not found a aincle 
clue implying that auch an ord$l' had been issued. 5 
It is true that Israel's tund,a.mental problem is a basic popu-
lati01'1 im'bal.a.Dce. But, the Arab• ,Qlaim that, "it a large increase in 
the Arab popula-tion ot tbe country could be ba.laaced by a proportiona-te 
increaae in the Jewish population, Israel could, with international 
1Badeau, P. 104. 
2Ibid. 
-
3Ibid. 
-4Ibid. 
5Goichon, P. 300. 
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assistance, oope with the resulting difficulties. "1 Such a measure 
would prove Israel's good faith and would induce Arab eont'idence in 
contributing constructively towards a settlement of this dilemma. 
Unfortunately, the annexation of Arab Jerusalem not only defied 
the United •ationa General Assembly Resolution but also acted as pol-
itical clynui te, · creating in the heart of Jerusalem the fetus of .Arab 
reaittance. 2 
b unticm.ed evlier, the IQ:Ptiana, aa vell u the rest of the 
Arab World, vue s\\f'tering from the tra'WIII!L of the Suez Attair. The 
BQ".Pti&Jui were perauaded that: l) Israel was an aggreaai ve state 
vh!eh aoupt onlT to impose certdn ilolutiou on the Arab world; 3 
2) Iaftel vu a.n expauaioniat atatet with the conquest of Sinai, the 
Gasa Strip &114 the West Jordarl, the Israelis inaisted that there should 
'M no Yithdr&Y&l t:rom the occupied territories without a peace settle-
Mat. 4 'This idea vu not onl;r voiced 'by K. Begin, vho voul.d have re-
eatabliahe4 Israel on the historical frontiers of Palestine. but &lao 
bf the stataents of Levi Eahltol. General Dtqan a.nd Yigal Allon, "who 
eapoued the old Zionist olaia, tbat Israel, by scriptual right, should 
extend to th• 'bank.& of the Jordan river. •5 
~lph Detsiey, "Uni t;r or Aims," The lcoi).OIIist, Vol. CCXXIV, 
Jo. 6464 (July 15, 1967), P. 176. 
~torial, "A Matter of :rom," The :loonomistt Vol. CCXXIV, Mo. 
6467 (August 5, 1967), P. 481. 
3 Rouleau, P. 50. 
4
:&4! torial, "'!'he Araba Ca 't Just Wait, • The Economist, Vol. 
CCXXIV, No. 6470 (August 26, 1967) • P. TOT. 
'Ibid. 
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Moreover, the Egypti&JlS were convinced that the United States was 
bent upon the overthrow of the laaeer regime. The Editor-in-chief or 
the Al-.Ahrem, Huaaanein Reikal, aupported th:l.a v:tev in several articles 
Which appeared in 1967, to the etreot that the Egypto-American relations 
had reached a brealdng point. Similarl)", when, on April 21, 1967, leas 
than three web before the outbreak ot the Israelo-Arab eontliot, the 
coup 4' ''M:t in Greece took plaae,. it . wu iJaed:tatel)" ir~terpreted in 
Egyptian ciMlea u one step closer to'lrari.8 the Mic!dle kat soa1. aimed 
at by the UD.ite4 States •1 Acoor4iag .to 't;he cont14ential bulletin ot the 
oD11' J:crptiu l'Oli tical Party, it wu conjectured that, after the 
Atherdaa coup, it ld.pt Yell be the tl~Z"ft ot the Goven~~tent ot AHhbiahop 
Makarioa, beaauae the IQPtiana W\IZ'e oonvil:lced that the .Americus were 
tr,riag to eatabli&h a ~8Dt.$t their chOice to consolidate their 
positicm in the luterD MHitel'!'&llean. 2 . It vu reckoned, moreover, 
that the .Amerioua would moat probably attack Syyia, the weakest point 
in the progreaain Arab world. .After Yb.ieh, they wuld carr:y out their 
ulti-.te ob4eatin ot overthroviac .lfuaw•a regiae in Egpt. 3 'l'he day 
after the Atheniaa ooup, it w.a tn American toreip polio,. which 
Nuaer attaobt4. Be ftB conviQOed th•t .America had decided to 4o away 
with the neutral or pro-Rwlaiaa regiaea ell crter the world. TheT would 
cite the tau ot Sllk.l.:no u4 lf'Kruaab, u an aeaple. They &leo held 
that the Aaclo-American policies in Y.aen and Aden were aimed at 
~eau, P. 54. 
20Ual Abd-al-Nuaer, 'RlaoO't&I"B (Le Caire I Miaist~re de l 'Ird'or-
mation du Caire, 1967), P. 50. 
3Ibid. 
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undel'lllining the Egyptian regime. 1 This was atron~ felt in Cairo. 
On Mq 8, 1967, when two ~en of the SyTian Government arrived 
in Cairo to intol'll Nuser ot Israel' 1 preparations to launch a major 
attaolt to overthrow the Damalcua re&Uae, Nuaer heai tated to co& t him-
self to any help. Likewise, M&nhal. Aller waa over-ruled, when he urged 
'that the Arabs JAWJt strike tint betore actual righting began. 2 OnJ.y 
after the USSR Intellip~c• S.rri.ce hu oontir.d Israel's iratention to 
attaok S,.ri.a, on Ma;r 12, a:nd the .Israeli authorities had proclaimed 
their iu:tentioa of overthrovina the Duuoua regime and putting an end 
to the activities of the Palestinian Colmtancloa, wu Nuaer convinced 
that hi a t\11'11 voul.d be next. lle had two aJ. ternati vea 1 by avoiding in-
...ol Tellleat in the Syriaa &tt'air, .he rialted loaing prestige among the Arab 
countrie•t or, by interrening, he rillked being crwahed by Israel. 3 
Buser vu eonacious that in .1956 it na •inl7 due to Preaident 
EiaeDhover'a interftlltion that ~~ wu reacwtd from the Angl.o-J'nmoo-
Iaraeli triaagle attuk·. However, . this sentiment vaa prot0\Ul4ly changed 
by the introduction ot n.w elementaa the nationalization ct private 
enterprise in B8111\J ";he liberation ot Egyptian communists troa prison' 
the re-intoraement of relations vith the USSR; the war in Yemen; and, 
finally', the agi tationa in Aden, which 4ireotly' affected Anglo-American 
4 interests in the Pen ian Gulf. In tact, there had been a rupture of 
1 Rouleau, P. 57. 
2 Ibid., P. 54. 
3Gulal. Abd-al-Nuser, Diacoun, P. 50. 
4 !!!!_!. • p. 56. 
diplomatic relations between Cairo and Washington. Furthermore. the 
American Govel"mmlen.t had stopped deli very o! wheat to Egypt. Cairo vas 
led to believe that the Americans sought to starve the Egyptiana and to 
suf'tocate Naaser' a eoonOllliY, in order to pave the Ytq !or the eventual 
overthrow o! the ~gi.me •1 Nasser had not 'forgotten the Moslem Brothars' 
plot in 1965, supposedly, at the instigation of the C.I.A. 2 
'ro repeat, the Arabs think ot Israel as au expansionist state. 
'l'beir conviction is baaed on it's three vus of expansion& the expan-
sions of 1948 an4 Israel'• insistence on keeping the territories as war 
booty, and the Sinai Campaie;n of 1956. Fu:~:eermore, the declarations 
made b;y Levi Eehkol that, "we -.re not disposed to cede a single inch of 
our l.a:ncl ·• • • • 3 aad elsewhere, he &44e4: 
: Palestine had al.re~ been amputated in the course o! the 
:rirst World Wa:r, tol.l.ovina the Sykes-Picot Agreement' a second 
tiM durin& the creation of Jor4an by Churchill, and a third time 
in 1948. We cannot endure a fourth amputation. It does not leave 
1110re' than 20 ,000 ldlomete:ra o! the ancient Palestine, and ve have 
to think of' the millions of' JfNS who, in the course ot the next 
deoade 'fll em:larate from Ru.esia, We•tern Europe ancl the Unitecl 
States, 
oan only reoontira Arab belief' that Israel is an expansionist state. 
Mono'ftr, Levi l!lahltol oonai&.red not only a part ot Iraq, but also parte 
o! Syria an4 '.rreuJordan, u constituting the territory ot biblical 
Palestine. On the basis o! these statements, the Arabs indeed feared 
1aama1 A.bd-al ... luser • DiscoUJ:"'I , P. '56. · 
2Ibid. 
~ Monda, Januazoy 13, l96T, 1'. 2 .. 
4Ibid. 
99 
that , given the opportunity, Israel would realize its dre811!.. 1 
On the other hand, since Israel, in the eyes of the Arabs, is an 
alien state, created by force in a "country rightly belonging to the 
Arabs, "2 it is understandable that Iasser should request the "ii1i thdra:wal 
ot tl'1ID' and the closure of the Gulf of Aqaba, in order to win the ap-
plause of the rest ot the Arab wrld. 
'1'o what extellt the Soviet Union wu responsible for the Arab ac-
tion, is not eaa7 to assess. The Soviet position ia the Security Coun-
cil,. oa the qu.eetion of the blockade, indicated that Egypt had not con-
sulted the Son.et Union's opinion. However, the conf'lict vas veloomed 
by the Soviets, :l.a so tar as 'the tension had strengthened ·their position 
in the Mi44le East, while the United States was busy in Viet lam. But. 
it ••- that the Soviet Union had uaume4 that the United States would 
not allow l8nel to engage in open hostiU ties. On the oon~rary, the 
Uui ted State veuld bring the matter to the attention of the United 
Na-.iona Seouri.v Couacil where, the Sarln Union would carey on a diplo-
ma:tic oamp&ip in tavor ot the AraH. 3 It is obvious that tbe former 
had cmer-estiaate4 the latter's strengthl in the event of an attack, 
the A:ft.b &Z'IO" could at least oarr,y on the battle until Ur.d. ted Nations 
intervention bi'Ought the matter to the Security Council for reconsider-
ation. 4 It is poseible that, had the United Bationa intervened in time, 
1 Alem, P. 110. 
~estler, P. 29. 
~au, P. 70. 
4Ibid. 
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Egypt would have scored a :po~i tical victory. Its precarious leadership 
would have been consolidated; and, Arab unity would have been achieved. 
This may well be the reason tor Naaaera voluntary plunge into a "game 
ot brinkmanship."! Thus the interpl~ of these fbroea auttioea to il-
luatr&te that, tor three generations, the "Palestine Conflict" has been 
a deciaive'faotor not only in intra-Arab politics but also in there-
2 la.tiODahip of the Arabs via-a-via Is.:rael. 
Likewise, much has been said about the reasons underlying the bel-
ligerentst motiTes. It we allow ours•lvea to speculate, it is reason-
able to ueume, on the basi a of the •vidence at hand, that Iasser' s 
obj 80ti ve wu a political rather .than a m.ili tary showdown. 3 
He was comnced that a firm ,stand asaiut what he believed to be 
a planned' Israeli attack on Syria Jd.ght exert enough pressure on the 
United latiou tor tum .. to oonsidAr a settlement favourable to the Arab 
states. This JM&nt a return; not to .the 1956, but to the 1948 situ~ 
ation. Furthermore, the aim ot this political manoeuver was not ll4~::0a!Jr 
to aTU"t an impendi~ Is,.....li invuion but also to provide an oppor-
tunity tor the United lations to :reconsider the entire question ot · 
Pal.estine.t. 
~u, P. 102. 
2Ibid. 
3~1!.· 
4 Alem, P. 112. 
CONCLUSION 
v As we have seen, the 1967 War between the Arab states and Israel 
was the product ot a peculiar blend of internal and external forces. 
The poet-Suez era, by any standards~ was not a peace:f'u.l period, &1. though 
a precarious equilibrium existed in the area; the disputants had man-
aged to refrain trom major hostilities. However, the eruption of ex-
ploaive tignting in 1967 implies the intrusion of a nev factor in the 
1 Middle· Eut balance of forces, which upset the status quo. 
/Within the context of the int.erp~~ of these a;rnudc forces. the 
' ~ 
1967 War takes on a nev perspectivec/ the Middle East was not only the 
aeene ot va.r between the Arab states and I1rael, it vas also the battle-
field ot tvo other wars - the intra-Al"ab war and the cold war. All 
three were being waged simultaneously' in June 1967. 
To the coaplerlties ot this three-dimensional war, another el-
aent waa added. The conscious or unconscious beliefs and convictions 
of Arabs and Israelis, forged by the events of the past three gener-
ations, bad began to manifest themselves in a aeries of misinterpret-
a tiona of the intentions of the parties invol ve4. 
Chronologicall.y', the factors ,contributing to the 1967 War were: 
l) a cycle ot raids ud reprisals betveen Israel and Syria; · 2) 
Egypt's closure of the Strait ot Tiran to Israeli shipping' 3) de-
tens• pacts between EQI1)t-8yrla and 18'1Pt-Jordan' 4) ebangea in the 
~raper. P. 3. 
101 
! 
policies of the "big tvo" vis-it-vis the Arab states and Israel. 
None of these by itself could have changed the situation signifi-
ca.ntly but, together, they exerted enough pressure to tilt the uneasy 
equilibrium. However, "the real casus belli was a struggle against 
history. nl But , 
Hiator,y cannot be judged by the application ·or any rigid code 
ot etb.in, it can oDly' be represented in the manner of Greek 
tragedy'~ where the antagonists are both in the right in their own 
terms of reference and in their ovn uni Terse of disooura. 2 
In the trage~ of Arabs and JfiWS, the Palestinian drama is a war 
ot nationalism, vbich has luted tor three generations and cannot be 
solved by the masical formula of a peace treaty, direct negotiatione or 
a compromise to meet the demands of each party. Untortuna.tely, many 
contentions between the Arab states an4 Israel haTe been over super-
f'icia.l matters, albeit significant in themselves, they are seconda.J!'T 
to the real cause of the war. Although a remedy' f'or these conniots 
un4oubtecll:r help to ease the chronic tensions in the area, it will not 
Yipe out the cawse ot the present dispute. 
The reason is that. the Arabs' arguments have a solid historical 
and juridieal basisa Palestine had been Arab for 13 centuries and the 
!'ormation of the theocratic Zionist state in Palestine vas contrary to 
the righ-ts of the people involved. 3 
l"urthe%'111Dre, it vu auti-8emi.tie Europe vbieh paved the Ya:'f tor 
the birth of political Zionism; it wu the Ifazi m.aesacre that vas the 
l Draper, P. 15. 
~oestler, P. 23. 
3A1em, P. 188. 
foster father of the State of Israel. In the words of Jean-Pierre 
Alem., a detrimental factor ot the drama "is not so DlUCh the presence of 
the Jen .• with whom the Arabs have the opportunity of co-habitation, 
but the representative of a truly explosive civilization; a civiliz-
ation:Whioh had never been known.to respect other people and could not 
e:x;pand without sowing the seeds of disorder and demoralisation. nl 
MoaUJ". the Israelis are Europeana themael. ves. :barlpl.es can be oi ted 
that b-.r vi tneaa to the tact that origin&l Western groups can never 
live toaether with indigenous people in reciprocal and haraonious re-
spect 1 South At:rica and Algeriat in the United Sta'tes ot America 
V'bere 'the probl• is ao:re aoute, tha-t of 'the massacre and the contine-
2 aent of the survi wrs in the Indie.n Reserves. 
However, as tor Palestine, t}\e inexorable logic of facta dictates 
that no room tor a second nation can be found in Palestine, except b;y 
the displacement and/or extermine.tion of the nation already in pos-
••••ion.3 
In the last ualysis, the o~ legitimate rea.eon for Israel's 
existence is "bued on the "right of conquest." However, this praise 
also admits the poaaibUity of :reconquest by the same brutal force, the 
ript to uproot the problem. This method would endanger not only peace 
in the Middle last but, also, would bave a disastrous effect on world 
1Alea, P. 189. 
2Ibid. 
~aper, P. 21. 
l peace as well. 
Finally, it is in the failur~ to cooperate, egoism and hypocrisy 
of Western politics that one finds the germs of the present conflict. 
The Balfour Declaration of 2 November 1917, consecrated the success of 
the Zionist Organization. Not only were the Arabs not consulted re-
garding the fate of their own country but they were decieved in the 
promise ot independence JDII.de to tQem during the war, despite the tact 
that "the mterif rendered Britain a service greater than any that could 
be expected in the a&terial. realm. "2 
It is pertinent, then, to conclude that Palesine became twice 
promised a:nd therefore "promised to conflict. "3 
l 
:.A.la, P. 189. 
2 Jef:f'ries, P. 60. 
3 Alem, P. 7. 
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APPDDIX A 
APPENDIX A 
THE BRITISH GOVERNMENT' 8 DECLARATION ~ THE BEVEN .ARABS1 
LTh!s Declaration was made in reply to a memorial submitted to 
the Foreign Ottice "through the Arab Bureau in Cairo, by sevu Arab 
leadvs domiciled in IQPt. 
The Declaration was read out , by an ottieer ot the Arab Bureau at 
a aeetiaa ot the seven Arab leaden, which bad been specially convened 
tor the purpose on June 16, 1918, in Cairo. 
The text re~ueed here is m:r own rendering of the Arabic text 
which is in the posseasion ot one ot the seven memorialists. 
In Arab eiroles !,his Declara~ioD is usually known u the Dttc-
laration tc ~ Seven..J 
DECLARATION TO '1'B SEVD 
His Majesty' • Oovenaeu.t have considered the JHJilOri&l ot the 
Seven vi th great eve. They tul.ly appreciate ~he reuou.s tor the de-
sire of its authors to retain their ILJ.lOrqmi ty, but the tact that t.be 
--.orial is ano~ hu in no way detracted trom. the value which His 
MaJesty's Govermunt assign to that doc'UlAent. 
The territories mentioned in ,the mamorial tall into tour cat-
egories&-
( i) Territories vhich YeJ:e tree &ad indepen4ent before the 
outbreak ot 1the War; 
(ii) Territories liberate«. troa '!'ukiah rule by the action of 
the Arab thellselYe&l 
laeorge Antonius, The Arab AwalteDiy. 
2rrbe memorialists were J!ta.tiq al.-' Azm.; Shailth Kamel al-Qusab; 
Mukhtar al-Bulh; • Abdul-Rahman Shahbandar; Khaled al-Balda; J'aui 
al-Bakri; Hasan Rimadeh. 
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(iii) Territories liberated from Turkish rule by the action of 
the Allied armies~ 
(iv) Territories still under Turkish rule. 
With regard to the first two categories,1 His Majesty'a Govern-
ment recognise the complete and sovereign independence ot the Arabs 
inbabi ting those territories, and support them in their struggle for 
freedom. 
With regard to the territories occupied by the Allied armies, 2 
His Majesty's Government invite the attention of the memorialists to 
the proclamations issued b;y the commander-in-chief on the occasions 
ot the capture ot Baghdad (March 19, 1917) and of the capture of 
Jerusalem (Deeeaber 9. 1917). These proclamations define the poliey of 
His MaJesty's Government towards the inhabitants of those regiona. 
vhieh is that the tuture soverument of those territories should be 
based upon the priaeiple of' the consent of the governed. This policy 
vill a.l.wa;ys be that of His Majesty• s GovernJ~Lent. 
With regard to the territories in the fourth eategor;y, 3 it is the 
desire of His Majeat;r's Government that the oppressed peoples in those 
territories should obtain their freedom and independeaee. His Maj-
est:r • a Govenuaeat Yill continue to work tor the achievement of that 
object. They are tu.lly aware of the difficulties aa~perils which 
threatu those vho are striving tor the Lliberationlf · of the inhabi-
tuts of those territories. 
In spite ot those obstacles, .however, His Majesty's Government 
believe that the difficulties caa be overcome, and they are prepared 
to give every support to those who are striving to overcome them. They 
a.t"e ready' to consider any scheme ot co-operation which does not con-
flict with the militar;r operations in hand or with the political prin-
ciples proclaimed by His Majesty's Government and their allies. 
' 
1i. e. , the independent states of the Arabian Peninsula, and the 
Hejas aa tar north as 'Aqaba! · 
2In June 1918, when this atataent was issued, those territories 
comprised the greater part of Iraq (inclusive of Basra and Baghdad) and 
the southern hal.f of Palestine (inclusive of Jerwaalem and Jatta). 
3i.e., the hitherto l.mliberated portions of Iraq and Syria. 
4
'!'his word is obscure in the Arabic source. 
APPROVAL SHEET 
The thesis submitted by Mrs. Leila Enayat-Seraj (n'• Rishtya) has been 
read and approved by- the tollowin,a col'lllitteeJ 
Dr. Francis Scbvarzenberg, 
Prot.essor ot Political Sc:;ience, wy-ola 
Dr. Thomas J. Bennett, 
Associate Dean, Loyola 
The final copies have been examined by- the director ot the thesis and 
the signature which appears below verities the tact that any necessary 
changes have been incorporated and that the thesis is now given tiDAl 
approval by the Committee with reference to content and torm. 
The thesis is therefore accepted in partial tultUlment ot the require-
menta tor the degree ot Master ot Arts. 
/v'av - ~/D I ~ 7 7 
Date 
1 
- f I Director's Signat 
lll 
